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Childcare is often viewed as one of the biggest barriers to work, particularly among lone parents. 
All children in England are eligible to start part-time nursery education from the beginning of the 
academic term after they turn three, and most are eligible to start full-time primary education on 
1
  September  following  their  fourth  birthday.  Both  policies  effectively  provide  parents  with  a 
number of hours of free childcare. Moreover, these rules mean that some children born only one 
day apart are eligible to start nursery up to four months apart and school up to one year apart. 
This  report  exploits  these  discontinuities  to  investigate  the  causal  impact  of  a  lone  parent’s 
youngest child being eligible for part-time nursery education or full-time primary education on 
welfare (benefit) receipt and employment outcomes.  
 
The  method  used  is  called  the  regression  discontinuity  (RD)  approach.  This  boils  down  to 
comparing the outcomes of lone parents whose youngest child is born just before a cut-off date (1 
September, for example) with those born on or just after that date. The attraction of doing this is 
that the two groups of lone parents should be very similar to each other, except that the youngest 
child of one group of lone parents is eligible for nursery or school; this is similar to what would be 
achieved in a randomised experiment. 
 
The report makes use of rich administrative data (the Work and Pensions Longitudinal Study) 
which records children’s exact date of birth and home postcode (used to identify the admissions 
policy in each lone parent’s local authority). It improves on previous studies by estimating the 
precise timing (relative to the date on which part-time nursery or full-time primary education 
begins) of any impact on labour supply, allowing an assessment of whether there are anticipation 
or experience effects. Moreover, it focuses on a group which previous studies have suggested are 
particularly responsive to this type of incentive. 
 
Key findings, and lessons for policy 
 
Having  a  youngest  child  who  is  entitled  to  full-time primary  education  (rather  than part-time 
nursery education) increases the proportion of lone parents on Income Support who leave welfare  
by a small, but significant, margin of around 2 percentage points, or 10 per cent. The impact on 
those who move into work is very similar. These effects do not start to emerge until some four to 
six months after entitlement to school begins, which suggests that lone parents may not start 
looking for work until this point. The impact peaks around eight to nine months after the child 
becomes eligible for school. There is weaker evidence of an even smaller effect of eligibility for 
part-time nursery education on lone parents’ labour supply. 
 
These effects are small in comparison to the proportion of lone parents with children around 
school-entry age who are leaving welfare and entering employment over time anyway, a finding 
which is pertinent to the new government’s plan to remove entitlement to Income Support for 
lone parents whose youngest child is aged five or over. The results suggest that eligibility for full-
time primary education (corresponding to a relatively large childcare subsidy) does not precipitate 
a  large  increase  in  labour  market  activity  around  age  five.  Moreover,  they  suggest  that  the 
expansion  of  public  education  programmes  to  younger  disadvantaged  children  –  such  as  the 
recently announced policy of extending free nursery education to disadvantaged two year olds – 
may not by itself encourage many low income lone parents into work (although, of course, this is 
not its primary aim). 
 
It is interesting to compare the findings of this report to those of other programmes affecting lone 
parents, such as In Work Credit, New Deal for Lone Parents and Work Focused Interviews. Brewer 
et al (2009) report that, after 12 months of being potentially eligible for In Work Credit, an extra 
1.6 percentage points of potentially eligible lone parents had left benefit. Cebulla et al (2008) 
calculated the impact of the New Deal for Lone Parents on all lone parents on benefit to be 1.7 
percentage points after nine months. They also reported that, after 12 months, the impact of 
Work Focused Interviews (WFIs) was 2.0 per cent for lone parents with youngest children aged 9–
12. Eligibility for full-time primary education seems, therefore, to have an impact on lone parents’ 
labour  supply  broadly  comparable  to  these  three  welfare-to-work  programmes,  but  at  vastly 
greater cost. (Of course, the main aim of universal education is to improve children’s outcomes 
rather than to increase parents’ labour supply.) Starting school and leaving welfare: the  
impact of public education on lone  
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1  Introduction 
 
 
The link between the availability or price of formal childcare and maternal employment is of 
considerable policy interest, but understanding it poses significant technical challenges.
1  
 
The policy interest arises because most OECD countries provide significant financial support 
for  childcare  (as  well  as  regulating  care  providers  to  ensure  minimum  standards), 
particularly of pre-school children, through direct provision of group childcare, subsidies to 
private  and  not-for-profit  providers,  or  cash  payments  or  tax  breaks  to  parents  using 
childcare.
2  The  policy  goals  vary  across  countries,  but  will  usually  be  a  combination  of 
promoting children’s development and allowing parents to engage in paid work. So policy-
makers need to know not just how childcare can affect children’s development but also how 
the availability or price of formal childcare relates to parental employment.  
 
But estimating the link between the availability or price of formal childcare and parental 
employment poses significant technical challenges. Brewer & Paull (2004), drawing on Blau 
(2003) and Blau & Currie (2004), argue that this is due to a combination of inadequate data 
(the quality of formal care is rarely observed in large-scale surveys, and the quality, cost and 
availability of informal care never observed), misspecification of parents’ underlying choice 
set (many studies reviewed in Blau & Currie (2004) assume parents choose between freely-
available informal care and formal care, whereas many childcare users use both formal and 
informal care, and some have no informal care options), and a lack of plausible instruments 
to overcome selection bias (wages are observed only for those who work, and childcare 
prices and quantities are observed only for those who choose to use formal childcare).   
                                                           
1 By childcare, we mean what is referred to in the UK as “formal childcare”, i.e. care provided by someone who 
is not a relative or family friend. This could be group care (or centre-based care),  or care provided by a 
qualified carer in the carer’s own home (or, in the UK, care provided by a qualified person in the child’s own 
home). 
2 For example, the UK government provides financial support for childcare amongst working parents through 
the  childcare  element  of  its  Working  Tax  Credit  (see 
http://taxcredits.hmrc.gov.uk/Qualify/WhatAreTaxCredits.aspx), and also offers direct provision, particularly 
targeted  at  disadvantaged  families,  through  Sure  Start  Children’s  Centres 
(http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/everychildmatters/earlyyears/surestart/whatsurestartdoes/).  See  Section  2.3  for 
more details. 2 
 
 
Despite these difficulties, many studies have sought to estimate the elasticity of maternal 
employment with respect to the price of formal childcare, mainly using regional variations in 
the  price  of  childcare  as  an  instrument.
3  Anderson  &  Levine  (1999)  report  that  “these 
studies  do  uniformly  find  a  negative  relationship  between  childcare  costs  and  mothers’ 
employment”. But, reviewing much the same studies, Blau & Currie (2004) find that neither 
sample composition nor data sources can explain the considerable variation in the existing 
estimates, implying that “specification and estimation issues most likely play an important 
role in producing variation in the estimates”.  They conclude that “it is risky to generalize 
from  only  three  studies,  but  the  fact  that  the  studies  that  accounted  for  unpaid  [i.e. 
informal] child care in ways consistent with the existence of an informal care option [Ribar 
(1995),  Blau  &  Hagy  (1998),  Tekin  (2003)+  produced  small  elasticities  *of  mothers’ 
employment with respect to the price of childcare] suggests that the true elasticity may be 
small”. There is also little consensus as to whether such elasticities are greater for lone 
mothers or married women. 
 
Given these difficulties, economists have tried to use policy variation as a way of generating 
instruments  for  the  price  or  availability  of  formal  childcare.  For  example,  Lefebvre  & 
Merrigan  (2008)  and  Baker  et  al  (2008)  both  study  an  expansion  of  universal,  highly-
subsidized childcare for pre-school children that took place in Quebec in the 1990s, using 
other provinces in Canada as a comparison group. Using different data sources, both find a 
significant impact on maternal employment.  
 
A related strand of literature has sought to estimate the impact of children beginning full- or 
part-time  education  on  maternal  labour  supply.  This  is  of  interest  in  its  own  right  (for 
example, in estimating the costs and benefits of publicly-funded education systems, but also 
in  thinking  about  when  to  apply  work-search  requirements  to  lone  parents  receiving 
welfare, as we discuss in the conclusion), but such impacts have also been seen as relevant 
to the question of whether formal childcare for pre-school children affects parental labour 
supply.  Brewer  &  Paull  (2004)  note  that  “the sudden  provision of  free  childcare during 
                                                           
3 Note that most studies refer almost exclusively to the effect of childcare on maternal (rather than parental) 
employment. 3 
 
school hours should encourage mothers to enter work or extend their working hours...yet 
reality may not be so simple: suitable childcare to cover the remaining hours may not always 
be available or may create too many complexities in differing and irregular arrangements. In 
addition, a child starting school brings a new involvement in school life for the parent as well 
as the child, potentially generating new responsibilities for the mother outside the formal 
labour market” (p10). Despite these competing effects, the appeal of examining the impact 
of children beginning full- or part-time education on parental labour supply is that school (or 
pre-school) admissions policies can provide convincing natural experiments that can tell us 
about causal impacts; furthermore, as entitlement to public education tends to be universal, 
there are no selection problems of the kind that might arise by studying a means-tested 
programme (Gelbach, 2002).  
 
While a number of studies make use of geographical or time variation in the introduction or 
expansion of pre-school or kindergarten programmes (see, for example, Schlosser, 2006, for 
Israel, and Cascio, 2009, for the US), the principle behind many of these studies is to make 
use of date-of-birth cut-offs that exist when schools or school districts determine when a 
child can or should begin full-time education. These administrative rules mean that a child’s 
birthday (or month or quarter of birth) or age can be used as an instrument for attending 
full-time education (as in Gelbach, 2002, as we explain below), or that researchers can use a 
regression discontinuity design (as in Berlinski et al, 2009, Fitzpatrick, 2010, and this study) 
exploiting the fact that admissions rules mean that children born a day apart are eligible to 
start school up to a year apart.  
 
As we discuss in more detail in Section 3, our study builds on and develops the findings in 
Gelbach (2002), Berlinski et al (2009) and Fitzpatrick (2010). We examine the impact of 
eligibility for publicly-funded, free, full-time primary education (relative to publicly funded, 
free, part-time nursery education) on the labour supply of lone parents in England whose 
youngest child turns four between 2000 and 2004
4. We make use of birth date cut-offs in 
eligibility rules: in the areas of England we focus on, most children are eligible to start school 
in the academic year which starts after they turn four. So, for example, a child born on 31 
                                                           
4 Full-time primary education is broadly equivalent to kindergarten, and part-time nursery education is broadly 
equivalent to pre-K in the US. 4 
 
August 2006 will be eligible to start school on 1 September 2010 (aged 4 years and 1 day), 
but a child born just one day later on 1 September 2006 will be eligible to start school a 
whole  year  later  on 1 September  2011  (aged 5  years).  We  also examine  the  impact  of 
eligibility  for  publicly-funded,  free,  part-time  nursery  education,  to  which  children  in 
England become entitled from the beginning of the term after they turn three. 
 
We examine the impact of this eligibility on lone parents (predominantly mothers) receiving 
welfare benefits who have no younger children using administrative data on welfare receipt 
and employment spells. Clearly we cannot claim that our results are informative about the 
likely response of all mothers with three or four year olds in England. But lone mothers with 
no younger children are the group that Cascio (2009) and Fitzpatrick (2009) identify as being 
the  most  responsive  to  starting  (pre-)kindergarten  in  the  US.  And  there  are  several 
advantages  of  using  administrative  (rather  than  survey)  data:  accurate  measures  of the 
children’s date of birth and home address (which we use to determine the relevant school 
admissions policy), continuous (not point-in-time) measures of outcomes (whether receiving 
welfare and/or in employment), and a 100% sample. Indeed, the key advantage of our study 
compared to previous ones is that we can estimate the precise timing (relative to the date 
on which children become eligible) of the impact of eligibility for full- or part-time public 
education, including testing for anticipation effects, something that to our knowledge no 
other studies have been able to do. 
 
The disadvantage of our study compared to previous ones is that we have no direct measure 
of school or nursery enrolment, which means that our estimates are of the intention-to-
treat: we estimate the causal impact of being entitled to publicly-funded, free, full-time 
education (or publicly-funded, free, part-time nursery education), and not the causal impact 
of attending school or nursery, or being induced to attend school or nursery, as in Gelbach 
(2002) or Berlinski et al (2009). However, we argue that our estimates are close to the 
causal  impact  of  attending  full-time  primary  education  (relative  to  part-time  nursery 
education), or of attending part-time nursery education, because very few lone parents on 
welfare will be using private schools or private childcare facilities. Moreover, it is not at all 
common for parents in England to hold their children back a year, as can happen in other 
countries: the majority of children will therefore be in full- or part-time education of any 5 
 
kind if and only if they are entitled to publicly-funded, free, full-time primary education or 
publicly-funded, free, part-time nursery education.  
 
Using a regression discontinuity approach, we find that, amongst those receiving welfare 
when their youngest child is aged approximately three and a half, eligibility for full-time 
primary education (relative to part-time nursery education) increases the proportion of lone 
parents off welfare and in employment by a small but significant margin that peaks (at 
around 2 percentage points, or 10-15 per cent) eight to nine months after the child becomes 
eligible (aged approximately 4 years and 9 months). Moreover, we find that these effects do 
not start to emerge until some four to six months after eligibility, which suggests that lone 
parents may not start looking for work until their child enters school. This indicates that 
some previous estimates (notably those of Gelbach, 2002, and Fitzpatrick, 2010) may under-
estimate the effect of (pre-)kindergarten entry on mothers’ labour supply, as they are only 
able  to  consider  outcomes  seven  and  five  months  respectively  after  the  children  have 
started  school.  Amongst  those  receiving  welfare  when  their  youngest  child  is  aged 
approximately two and a half, we find some evidence of a slightly smaller effect of eligibility 
for  part-time  nursery  education  on  the  proportion  of  lone  parents  off  welfare  or  in 
employment.  
 
We make use of a number of placebo tests to verify our results. In particular, we compare 
outcomes amongst parents of children who are either too young or too old to be affected by 
the school or nursery entry discontinuity (including those turning two, six and ten). We also 
compare outcomes amongst parents of children turning four who are born either side of a 
discontinuity which has no bearing on school entry. As hoped, we find virtually no difference 
in  welfare  receipt  or  employment  outcomes  for  any  of  these  groups,  which  provides 
reassurance that our main finding – of a small but significant effect of entitlement to full-
time primary education (relative to part-time nursery education) on welfare receipt and 
employment outcomes amongst low income lone parents – is valid. 
 
This paper now proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides background information about the 
provision of childcare and public education in England, as well as some information about 
employment  rates  and  childcare  use  amongst  lone  parents.  Section  3  outlines  our 6 
 
identification strategy and modelling approach, and describes the datasets that we use and 
how we select our sample. Section 4 describes our results and compares them to those from 
previous studies. Section 5 concludes. 
 
 
2  Institutional Background  
 
 
Provision of full-time public education in England 
 
The academic year in England runs from 1 September to 31 August, and is split into three 
terms (September to December; January to April; May to August). Parents are statutorily 
obliged to send their child to school (or provide alternative appropriate means of education 
such as home schooling) from the school term that begins after the child’s fifth birthday, 
earlier than in most OECD countries. This is known as the statutory school age. However, the 
age from which children are entitled to attend publicly-provided, free-to-access primary 
education is not determined by the national government; instead, it is up to each local 
authority
5 – and in some cases (as we discuss below), individual schools – to decide the age 
at which to admit pupils.  
 
For the overwhelming majority of children, an entitlement to attend publicly-provided, free-
to-access primary education is in place before the statutory school age. While parents are 
free not to take advantage of this entitlement while their children are below the statutory 
school age, anecdotal evidence suggests that it is difficult for parents to request alternative 
entry dates, and parents who do not use their entitlement at the earliest possible date may 
face a more restricted choice of schools, as there are legally-binding limits on class sizes for 
children in primary schools. Moreover, in contrast to the US – where it is common practice 
for parents of children who are young in their school year to hold them back (known as 
                                                           
5 There are around 150 local authorities in England. 7 
 
academic “red-shirting”
6) – parents in England appear to regard it as advantageous for their 
child to start school as early as possible. 
 
The  most  common  admissions  policy  adopted  by  local  authorities  in  England  (covering 
around 50% of school entrants) entitles all children to start school in the September after 
they turn four (we refer to this as Policy 1). So, for example, all children born between 1 
September 2005 and 31 August 2006 will be eligible to start school on 1 September 2010. It 
is clear that such a policy gives rise to considerable variation in the age at which children 
start school:  two children born only one day apart – on 31 August 2006 and 1 September 
2006 – will be eligible start school one year apart (the former on 1 September 2010, the 
latter on 1 September 2011). 
 
The  second  most  common  admissions  policy  (covering  around  15%  of  school  entrants) 
entitles  children  born  between  1  September  and  28/29  February  to  start  school  in  the 
September after they turn four, and children born between 1 March and 31 August to start 
school in the January after they turn four (we refer to this as Policy 2). In this case, a child 
born on 31 August 2006 would be eligible to start school in January 2011, while a child born 
just one day later on 1 September 2006 would be eligible to start school in September 2011, 
a gap of eight months. A further discontinuity also exists under this policy: a child born on 
28 February 2006 would be eligible to start school in September 2010, while a child born 
just one day later on 1 March 2006 would be eligible to start school in January 2011, a gap 
of four months. 
 
Policy  2  areas  are,  on  average,  more  deprived  than  Policy  1  areas,  with  lower  average 
employment rates, higher Index of Multiple Deprivation scores
7 and a lower proportion of 
lone parent owner occupiers. Lone parent welfare claimants living in Policy 2 areas tend to 
be older, have more children, are more likely to be from an ethnic minority background, and 
                                                           
6 http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2006/2006064.pdf suggests that around 6% of children start kindergarten a year 
late. These children are more likely to be male, white and from families with higher educational qualifications 
than those who start kindergarten on time. 
7 This is a measure of deprivation available at Super Output Area (SOA) level (comprising approximately 700 
households) in 2004 and makes use of information from seven different domains: income; employment; health 
and disability; education, skills and training; barriers to housing and services; living environment; and crime. 8 
 
have typically spent a smaller proportion of the past three years in work than lone parent 
welfare claimants living in Policy 1 areas.
8  
 
Of course, not all children in England will attend public (state) schools (although the vast 
majority of children in our sample are likely to do so). Moreover, some state schools (non-
community schools, catering for around 30% of primary school children in England
9) operate 
their own admissions policy (independent of the local authority policy). We discuss below 
what this means for our empirical work. 
 
 
Provision of part-time nursery education in England  
 
Local authorities in England are obliged to offer free-to-access nursery education for  all 
three and four year olds (usually in 2.5 hour sessions, five days a week, over the course of 
the school year).
10 This entitlement has existed for all four year-olds since 2001, and was 
phased in for three year olds over the period covered by our study, with 63 of the most 
deprived  local  authorities  (covering  approximately  86%  of  our  sample)  given  funding  to 
provide free part-time nursery places for three year olds from 2000.
11 Parents could either 
make  use  of  publicly-provided,  free-to-access  options,  which  were  generally  over-
subscribed, or, if they did not want to use (or could not access) these places, they were 
entitled to a voucher of a (supposedly) equivalent value which they could use at centre-
based childcare facilities run by private sector or not-for-profit organisations. This scheme is 
not limited to working families and is not subject to an income test; its primary aim is to 
                                                           
8 Source: authors’ calculations based on a sample of lone parents whose youngest child turns four between 
2000 and 2004, described in more detail in Section 3.4. 
9 Source: authors’ calculations based on school census data for all children attending state primary schools in 
England. Such schools exist within each local authority.  
10 There are similar programmes in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland as well.  
11 These local authorities are: Durham, Gateshead, Middlesbrough, Newcastle Upon Tyne, North Tyneside, 
South Tyneside, Stockton on Tees, Sunderland, Blackburn with Darwen, Blackpool, Bolton, Halton, Knowsley, 
Liverpool. Manchester, Oldham, Rochdale, Salford, Sefton, St Helens, Tameside, Wirral, Barnsley, Bradford, 
Doncaster,  Kingston  Upon  Hull,  Kirklees,  Leeds,  North  East  Lincolnshire,  Rotherham,  Sheffield,  Wakefield, 
Leicester, Nottingham, Birmingham, Coventry, Stoke on Trent, Telford and Wrekin, Walsall, Wolverhampton, 
Camden, Hackney, Hammersmith and Fulham, Haringey, Islington, Lambeth, Lewisham, Newham, Southwark, 
Tower  Hamlets,  Wandsworth,  Westminster,  Barking  and  Dagenham,  Brent,  Ealing,  Greenwich,  Hounslow, 
Waltham Forest, Brighton and Hove, Cornwall and Isles of Scilly, and Plymouth. Information derived from: 
http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/rsgateway/DB/SBU/b000430/bulletintext2003final.pdf. 9 
 
promote child development and ensure that all children are ready to start formal schooling 
at the age of five, rather than to facilitate work amongst parents. Almost all four year old 
children either benefitted from a voucher, or were enrolled in a publicly-funded and free-to-
access  nursery  or  reception  class  during  the  period  covered  by  our  study,  with  the 




Provision of and government support for childcare in England  
 
To identify the relevant counter-factual for our analysis, it is important to understand the 
policy regime faced by those pre-school children who are not entitled to full-time primary or 
part-time nursery education. During the period covered by our data, there were two main 
options  for  formal  childcare  for  pre-school  children:  1)  centre-based  care,  provided  by 
private  sector  companies,  not-for-profit  organisations,  and  (rarely)  directly  by  local 
authorities, and; 2) self-employed childminders, who provide non-relative care outside of 
the family home (almost always in the childminder’s home), and who must be registered 
with a statutory authority to care for children under the age of 8. Many families, of course, 
use informal care from relatives and friends as well as or instead of formal childcare.  
 
Aside from the provision of free part-time nursery education places (discussed above), there 
are two other programmes for supporting formal childcare in the UK. First, working families 
may be able to claim the childcare tax credit (from 2003, the childcare element of the 
working  tax  credit)  which  rebated  up  to  70% (from  2005,  80%)  of  spending  on  formal, 
registered, childcare (subject to a generous cap) for working families who passed an income 
test.
13 Second, from April 2005, employers could pay their employees childcare vouchers of 
up to £50 a week free of income tax and payroll taxes: these could only be used to pay 
registered, formal, child carers; care by relatives or friends was not eligible. 
 
                                                           
12 Source: http://www.dcsf.gov.uk/rsgateway/DB/SFR/s000604/SFR43-2005.pdf.  
13 Entitlements to these childcare subsidies were added to a family’s entitlement to the working families’ tax 
credit (from 2003, the working tax credit), and then withdrawn in the same way as those credits. This means 
that characterising how much a particular family could receive in support for childcare depends upon family 




Employment rates and childcare use amongst lone parents in England   
 
To put our sample into context, 27 per cent of families whose youngest child turned four 
between April 2001 and March 2005 were headed by a lone parent. Amongst lone parents 
with children of this age, 43 per cent were in work and 54 per cent were receiving welfare 
benefits.
14,15 This employment rate is low by international standards and  may be partly 
explained by the absence of work requirements for the vast majority of lone parents on 
welfare: all the lone parents in our sample would have expected to be able to remain on 
welfare (if their private income remained sufficiently low) until their children reached the 
age of 16 with no obligations to look for work or do any other work-related activities.
16   
 
In 2005, a job of 30 hours a week at the minimum wage would give gross earnings of £7,878, 
but a lone parent with 2 children would have a net income including all benefits and tax 
credits of £13,987, just above the poverty line for a family of that type in 2005-06 of £260 a 
week (where the poverty line is defined as 60% of median equivalised income). This was 
almost always greater than the total income from welfare benefits received by non-working 
lone parents, but the actual financial incentive to work would depend upon whether lone 
parents were receiving help with rental housing costs (which most were) and the size of 
their rents, because the programme that helps with rental costs, called Housing Benefit, is 
strongly means-tested against earnings.  With no rental costs, a non-working lone parent on 
welfare would receive £8,551 a year; with a rent of £60 a week, he or she would receive 
£11,671 a year. This means the participation tax rate (the fraction of gross earnings lost in 
tax and foregone welfare payments) for this 30 hour, minimum wage job would be 31% with 
                                                           
14 Based on our own analysis of the Family Resources Survey.  
15  By  “welfare  benefits”  we  mean  either  Income  Support,  Jobseeker’s  Allowance  or  Incapacity  Benefit. 
Incapacity Benefit is designed for claimants who are too ill to work. The main difference between Income 
Support and Jobseeker’s Allowance is that recipients of Income Support were not required to undertake any 
work-related activities while they had children aged 16 or under, but recipients of Jobseekers Allowance – the 
key benefit for the unemployed – were. Given that lone parents could choose which to claim, and would 
usually  be  entitled  to  identical  amounts  of  each,  only  a  tiny  fraction  of  those  on  welfare  were  receiving 
Jobseeker’s Allowance. 
16 In other words, at the time of our sample, lone parents were allowed to remain on welfare until their 
children reached 16. But this age cut-off began to fall in 2008, and, by 2012, lone parents whose children are 
all aged 5 or over will be subject to similar work-search requirements as other unemployed or disabled people.  11 
 
no housing benefit, but 67% with housing benefit (and it would be higher for those paying a 
high rent). 
 
Figure 1 shows how the employment rate amongst lone parents in the UK varies by age of 
youngest child. There is a substantial difference in the employment rate between those 
whose youngest child is 2 and those whose youngest child is 4, but little discernible change 
around the age at which children are entitled to start school. Unsurprisingly, what does 
change dramatically as children age is the type of childcare used by working families: Figure 
2 shows that there is a 30 percentage point difference in the use of childcare between 
children aged 2 with working lone parents and children aged 6 with working lone parents, 
almost all of which comes from a fall in the use of formal childcare.    
 
 
3  Methods and Data 
 
 
Relationship to previous studies 
 
Our study builds on and develops the findings in Gelbach (2002), Berlinski et al (2009) and 
Fitzpatrick (2010), so we start by briefly outlining the methods and findings of those studies. 
 
Gelbach (2002) sought to estimate the impact of public school enrolment (in kindergarten) 
on maternal labour supply, using US Census data from 1980. A straight-forward ordinary 
least squares (OLS) regression of measures of labour supply on enrolment in school would 
give biased results, as some parents used private schools, and others delayed their child’s 
entry to public schools. Gelbach argued that quarter-of-birth acts as a valid instrument for 
whether a five-year-old child is enrolled in public school, and he then uses it in regressions 
of various measures of labour supply on enrolment in public school, finding that public 
school enrolment increases labour supply for married mothers, and lone mothers with no 
younger children.  But, as Fitzpatrick (2010) argues, the issue with Gelbach’s results is that 
maternal labour supply is measured on the same calendar date for all mothers, and so the 
children  are  all  of  different  ages:  this  means  that  quarter  of  birth  will  be  an  invalid 12 
 
instrument if a mother’s labour supply is related to her children’s age independently of the 
impact of being enrolled in public school. 
 
Fitzpatrick (2010), in an approach very similar to our own, studies a related situation by 
exploiting date-of-birth cut-offs in eligibility for publicly-subsidised pre-kindergarten (pre-K). 
She argues that administrative rules create a sharp regression discontinuity, with children 
born on or before 1 September being different from those born on or after 2 September in 
that only the former are eligible for pre-K.
17 Using information on the exact date-of-birth of 
children of mothers in the US Census, she is able to use the regression discontinuity to 
estimate the causal impact of eligibility for universal pre-K on pre-school enrolment and 
maternal labour supply.  The approach adopted by Berlinski et al (2009) is very similar, 
exploiting  the  discontinuity  caused  by  administrative  cut-offs  as  an  instrument  in  a 
regression relating pre-school attendance to maternal labour supply in Argentina.  
 
The main difference between Gelbach and the subsequent two studies is that, with access 
to the children’s exact date-of-birth, Fitzpatrick (2010) and Berlinski et al (2009) can relax 
the assumption in Gelbach (2002) that a child’s age is not directly related to maternal labour 
supply.
18  A  disadvantage  common  to  Gelbach  (2002)  and  Fitzpatrick  (2010)  is  that  they 
record  labour  supply  outcomes  at  only two  particular points  in time  (and  on the  same 
calendar date for each mother): in a reference week before the Census interview (April 1980 
in Gelbach, and February 2000 in Fitzpatrick), and in the calendar year before the interview 
(1979 in Gelbach, and 1999 in Fitzpatrick). The latter outcomes cover a period where the 
children  are  in  kindergarten/pre-K  for  only  around  one  third  of  the  time  (4  out  of  12 
months, assuming a 1 September start date), meaning any estimated impact understates 
the true impact of full participation in kindergarten or pre-K. The former outcomes are 
measured approximately 7 months after the child started in kindergarten (or approximately 
5 months after starting pre-K). This is not invalid, but gives only a glimpse of the overall 
                                                           
17  She also uses states which did not offer universal pre-K as additional “controls”, so that the impact of pre-K 
is estimated as the difference in the regression discontinuity estimates of an effect in the states running the 
program, and those which were not. 
18 Fitzpatrick (2010) reports that a replication of Gelbach’s study using more recent US Census data that also 
uses precise date-of-birth of the children – and which can therefore relax the assumption that a child’s age is 
not directly related to maternal labour supply – finds that public school enrolment affects labour supply only 
among lone mothers with no younger children: see Fitzpatrick (2009). 13 
 
impact on maternal labour supply during the entire year in which some children are in 
kindergarten/pre-K and some otherwise-identical children are not, and gives no indication 
of whether any impacts occur immediately after school entry or with a lag, and whether 
they persist. 
 
Our aim is to build on the findings of these previous studies by exploiting the discontinuities 
in  eligibility  for  part-time  nursery  education  and  full-time  primary  education  described 
above to identify the causal impact of eligibility for these types of free public education on 
the labour supply of low income lone parents. One advantage of our study compared to 
previous ones is that we are able to estimate the precise timing of any impact of eligibility 
by comparing outcomes up to a year after children first become entitled. However, we are 
unable to observe school  or nursery enrolment in our data. This means that we are in 
essence  identifying  the  intention-to-treat  effect  of  living  in  an  area  in  which  the  local 
authority policy allows children to start part-time nursery or full-time school at a certain 
age. And, when considering the impact of eligibility for full-time primary education, it should 
be remembered that the relevant counterfactual for our population of interest is likely to be 
2.5 hours of free nursery education per day throughout the majority of this period (as low-
income lone parents are unlikely to be purchasing additional hours of formal childcare). 
Thus, these estimates should be regarded as the causal impact of living in an area in which 
the local authority policy offers children approximately 4 additional hours of free childcare 
per day during term time. 
 
 
The regression discontinuity   model 
 
We adopt a regression discontinuity (RD) design (Imbens & Lemieux, 2008). In a model in 
which  there  is  a  sharp  cut-off  based  on  age,  the  principle  is  that,  if  the  underlying 
relationship  between  the  outcome  and  age  is  smooth  (continuous),  then  individuals 
observed  just  above  and  just  below  the  cut-off  should  have  very  similar  observed  and 
unobserved characteristics; within this group, then, the allocation of treatment status is 
almost as good as random (Hahn et al, 2001; Lee, 2008). Of course, age is not measured 14 
 
strictly  continuously,  and  so  identification  relies  on  a  parametric  specification  of  the 
underlying relationship between age and the outcome (Card & Lee, 2008). 
 
Administrative date-of-birth cut-offs should lead to sharp discontinuities (Hahn et al, 2001), 
but, in this case, the discontinuity is fuzzy, mostly because of the 30 per cent of children 
who attend state schools that are responsible for their own admissions policies.
19 However, 
the discontinuity is not that fuzzy: Figures 3a to 3c, based on school census data of the 
population of students eligible for free school meals
20 who joined public (state) schools in 
England between academic years 2001-02 and 2004-05, show that a very high proportion of 
children  eligible  for  free  school  meals  (78  per  cent,  on  average)  started  school  at  the 
expected  time,  presumably  because  many  non-community  schools  find  it  expedient  to 
synchronise their admissions policies with that of the relevant local authority. Expected start 




To justify the use of the RD approach, it is customary to present a number of graphical 
analyses. First, as parents have some influence over the date of birth of their children, and 
given  that  it  is  widely  known  that  1  September  represents  a  discontinuity  in  school 
admissions policies, the distribution of births around the cut-off may not be continuous 
(McCrary, 2008). Figure 4 therefore shows the number of children in our sample born on 
each day in a 120 day window around our main cut-off. This figure suggests that while there 
are slightly fewer children born just before than just after the 1 September cut-off – which 
would be consistent with parents timing births so that their children start school later (as 
the oldest in their academic year)
22 – this difference is small relative to the variation in birth 
rates in the sample as a whole.
23  
                                                           
19 Our data do not tell us which school children attended, so there is no way of dropping children who attend 
such schools from our sample. 
20 The children of Income Support claimants will be a subset of those who are eligible for free school meals. 
21 Unfortunately, we cannot use the data from the school census to estimate a two-sample 2SLS estimator as 
the school census does not identify which children are in lone parent families. 
22 Gans & Leigh (2009) show striking evidence that parents have some ability to time births even given the date 
of conception. Lalive et al (2010) is another example of a sharp regression discontinuity design based on a date 
of birth cut-off. 




Second, if some families are more likely to time conception or birth than others, then there 
may  be  differences  in  observed  or  unobserved  characteristics  amongst  families  with 
children born either side of the cut-off. Appendix A illustrates graphically how some of the 
key observable characteristics vary by date of birth, while Table 1 presents differences in the 
mean values of these characteristics between families with children born up to 60 days 
before and 60 days after the 1 September cut-off. None of the Figures exhibit any obvious 
discontinuity  around  1  September,  and  Table  1  suggests  that  there  are  few  significant 
differences in terms of average characteristics between these two groups.
24,25 We account 
for these small differences in observable characteristics by including individual and local 






To operationalise this RD approach, ideally, we would estimate a model relating parents’ 
labour supply to child’s enrolment in school: 
 
            [1] 
 
where Yijcm is some labour supply outcome for parent i in local authority j in cohort c in 
month m; Sijcm is an indicator for whether the parents’ youngest child is in school in month 
m; X1ijc is a vector of individual characteristics that do not vary over time, such as gender, 
                                                           
24 There are some differences in terms of the age of the parent, presumably reflecting the fact that children 
born before 1 September are on average two months older than children born after 1 September when they 
are sampled, on 31 March. However, omitting controls for “age of parent” had no discernible impact on our 
estimates.  
25  These  results  are  confirmed  by  estimating  equations  analogous  to  (3)  in  Section  3.3  using  these 
characteristics as outcome variables (and no other regressors). 
26 The full set of controls in our models includes: gender, ethnicity, age, number of children, age of youngest 
child relative to cut-off, employment and welfare histories, an indicator for the amount of Income Support 
received (as a proxy for income), past participation in a particular voluntary welfare-to-work programme (the 
New Deal for Lone Parents), an indicator of disability, the proportion of formal childcare places available in the 
lone parents’ local area, their local area deprivation score, their local unemployment rate, the proportion of 
lone parents in their local area who are professionals (as a proxy for their own socio-economic status), and the 
proportion of workless lone parents in their area with particular education levels (as a proxy for their own 
education level). We also include a set of local authority dummies and a set of cohort dummies. 
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ethnicity and employment and welfare history at the point of selection into our sample; 
X2ijcm is a vector of characteristics that are allowed to vary over time, such as the local 
unemployment rate; µj is a set of local authority dummies; δc is a set of cohort dummies; 
and εijcm is an error term.  
 
However, Sijcm may be endogenous (if, for example, parents choose to hold their children 
back, or choose to access the private sector). The challenge we face, as did Gelbach (2002), 
Fitzpatrick (2010) and Berlinski et al (2009), is thus to find an instrument which induces 
exogenous variation in Sijcm but has no direct effect on Yijcm. As outlined above, our approach 
is  to  make  use  of  several  birth-date  discontinuities  that  arise  in  the  English  education 
system, whereby children of approximately the same age start school several  (up to 12) 
months apart. The main discontinuity we exploit compares children born either side of the 
academic year cut-off of 1 September. Let Aijc define a child’s day of birth relative to 1 
September, such that it equals 0 on 1 September, 1 on 31 August, -1 on 2 September, and so 
on. A potential instrument for school enrolment is the indicator variable: 
 
  Zijc=1{Aijc>0}                  [2] 
 
where Zijc = 1 if the child is born on or before 31 August and 0 otherwise.  
 
Berlinski et al (2009) use such an instrument to estimate a two-stage least squares estimate 
of α. But Sijcm is not observed in our data, and so we estimate a reduced-form version of [1]: 
 
    [3] 
 
This estimates α0, the impact of eligibility for full-time primary education (relative to part-
time nursery education) on parental labour supply.
27 Following Berlinksi et al (2009) and 
Fitzpatrick (2010), we control linearly for child’s age in days, allowing it to have differential 
                                                           
27 Note that we run separate regressions for each monthly outcome. Our main findings still hold up if we use 
seemingly unrelated regressions to take account of the fact that the errors may be correlated over time. We 
have also experimented with an individual random effects model, although this was less successful (as we have 
few time varying characteristics), and in any case we might be concerned about the correlation between the 
individual effects and our characteristics of interest. 
ijcm c j ijcm ijc ijc ijc ijc ijc ijcm X X Z A A Z Y                 2 2 1 1 2 1 017 
 
effects either side of the cut-off.
 Following Card & Lee (2008), we cluster standard errors by 





We use a 100% sample of administrative records, held by the UK Department for Work and 
Pensions,  which  record  information  about  welfare  receipt  and  time  spent  in  paid 
employment for all individuals who received a welfare payment or participated in a welfare-
to-work programme in Great Britain between June 1999 and March 2007.
28,29 This data 
allows  us  to  construct  detailed  employment  and  welfare  histories,  as  well  as  monthly 
outcomes. Being administrative data – collected for the purposes of administering welfare 
payments  or  paying  income  tax  –  it  contains  relatively  limited  information  on  personal 
characteristics, but does record information such as age, gender and ethnicity. 
 
We supplement this data with a more detailed record of the personal circumstances of 
individuals who claimed a particular means-tested welfare payment – Income Support – 
over the same period. Income Support is available to individuals who are working no more 
than 15 hours a week, have sufficiently low levels of financial capital, and a sufficiently low 
weekly income.
30 Moreover, the level of Income Support available to a particular individual 
                                                           
28 Technically, the employment data records spells where the individual was potentially liable to pay income 
tax, either through their earnings or receipt of a taxable state benefit, so may miss periods of part-time, low 
paid work (for example, an individual working 16 hours per week at the minimum wage in the UK would not be 
liable  for  income  tax).  This  would  suggest  that  we  might  underestimate  the  proportion  of  individuals  in 
employment  using  this  data.  However,  there  is  actually  strong  evidence  that  the  data  overestimates  the 
number of people in employment, due to inaccuracies in recording employment start and end dates. If the tax 
year during which the job started (ended) is known, but the day is not, then the start (end) dates are coded as 
those of the start (end) of the tax year, 6 (5) April; if the end date is entirely unknown, then the job may be 
regarded  as  ongoing.  Both  issues  lead  to  a  significant  overstatement  of  the  number  of  individuals  in 
employment at any given time. While we have cleaned the data to the best of our ability (for example, by 
using known welfare claim start dates to infer the end date of an apparently ongoing job), it is not possible to 
entirely correct for this issue. As we are primarily concerned with differences in employment rates, however, 
this type of measurement error will matter only to the extent that it varies systematically between parents of 
children born in different months. A priori, there is no reason to expect that it should. See Brewer et al (2009) 
for further discussion, including details of the data cleaning process and another example of the use of this 
data. 
29 The data is not publicly available, and this project was done under a contract with the data owners, the 
Department for Work and Pensions. 
30 Many of the income-related programmes in the UK welfare system use hours rules to enforce a dichotomy 
between welfare benefits which are aimed at families where no adult is in work, and tax credits which are 18 
 
depends on their personal circumstances – including whether or not they have a partner, 
how many children they have and the age of their youngest child – with all changes in 
circumstances recorded in this file. Importantly, this means that we have access to full date 
of birth of youngest child for all lone parents claiming Income Support.
31 
 
This file also provides us with the home postcode of the claimant. We use home postcode 
for two purposes: firstly, to map in very local area information about the number of formal 
childcare places on offer, and the local unemployment rate, both of which we might expect 
to affect the likelihood of a lone parent finding a job and leaving welfare.
32 Secondly, and 
more  importantly,  we  use  home  postcode  to  map  in  local  authority  admissions  policy 
information. This data was collected retrospectively by the authors for a previous study, and 
contains details of school admissions policies in England from 1989 to 2008: see Crawford, 
Dearden & Meghir (2010) for more details and another use of this data. 
 
As  we  only  observe  information  about  admissions  policies  in  England,  we  restrict  our 
attention to welfare recipients who are resident in England. We further restrict ourselves to 
claimants of Income Support as these are the only individuals for whom we observe date of 
birth of youngest child, and to lone parents, as past studies have suggested that they are 
more responsive than mothers with partners.  
 
To ensure that we have a reasonably lengthy period of employment and welfare history 
prior to sample selection, as well as a relatively long period over which to assess outcomes, 
we select individuals whose youngest child turns four between 30 November 2000 and 29 
November 2004, and who were on Income Support on 1 March in the year in which their 
youngest  child  turned  four:  this  allows  us  to  observe,  for  all  cohorts,  18  months  of 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
aimed at families where at least one adult is in paid work. Non-working lone parents would be entitled to 
other cash payments, principally child benefit, (from 2003) child tax credit and support for rental costs and 
local taxes (through housing benefit and council tax benefit). Some examples of the financial incentives to 
work faced by lone parents can be seen in Brewer, Saez & Shephard (2010) or Bell et al (2007). 
31 We do not observe the date of birth of older children. 
32 Of course, there is no a priori reason to suppose that lone parents of children born in different months 
systematically locate in areas with different characteristics, but we include such information to improve the 
precision of our estimates. 19 
 
employment  and  welfare  history,  and  three  years  of  monthly  employment  and  welfare 
outcomes. 
33,34 This gives us a total of 214,305 individuals. 
 
As a result of our regression discontinuity approach to identification, we restrict attention to 
individuals  born  immediately  either  side  of  each  of  our  cut-offs  of  interest  (primarily 1 
September and 1 March). Table 3 provides some indication of the sample sizes we use when 
analysing particular admissions policies, using individuals born up to 14, 30, 60 (our main 
specification) or 90 days either side of each cut-off.  
 
To estimate the effect of eligibility for part-time nursery education on the labour supply of 
low income lone parents, we compare children born either side of a 1 September, 1 January 
or 1 April discontinuity. As free part-time nursery places for three year olds were phased in 
over our period of interest, we do so using two samples: first, we select individuals whose 
youngest child turns three between 1 November 2000 and 31 October 2004, who were on 
Income Support on 1 March of the year in which their youngest child turned three and who 
live in one of the 63 local authorities given funding to provide free part-time nursery places 
ahead of schedule; second, we select individuals whose youngest child turns three between 
1 November 2004 and 31 October 2005 and who were on Income Support on 1 March of 
the  year  in  which  their  youngest  child  turned  three.  In  both  cases,  we  follow  these 
individuals  for  a  year  after  the  older  children  become  eligible  for  part-time  nursery 
education  (i.e.  up  to  the  point  at  which  they  become  eligible  for  full-time  primary 
education). Table 2 provides details of these sample sizes. 
 
 
   
                                                           
33 For individuals born close to our main cut-off (1 September), this means we sample lone parents who are on 
welfare when their youngest child is approximately three years and six months old. 
34 When considering the outcomes of parents of children turning two, six and ten as part of our placebo tests, 
we  choose  our  sample  in  exactly  the  same  way,  i.e.  we  select  individuals  whose  youngest  child  turns 
two/six/ten between 30 November 2000 and 29 November 2004 and who were on Income support on 1 
March of the year in which their youngest child turned two/six/ten. We discuss the samples we use to analyse 
the effect of eligibility for part-time nursery education on lone parents’ labour supply in Section 4.3. Table 2 
provides sample sizes for each of these groups. 20 
 
4  Results 
 
 
Policy  1 areas 
 
Our identification of the effect of eligibility for full-time primary education (relative to part-
time nursery education) on parents’ labour supply in Policy 1 areas arises from a comparison 
of children born either side of a 1 September cut-off, where the older children (those born 
in July and August in our main specification) are eligible to start school 12 months earlier 
than the younger children (those born in September and October in our main specification).  
 
Figure 5 plots the proportion of lone parents off welfare, monthly, from 6 months before 
the older children are eligible to start school to 18 months after the younger children are 
eligible  to  start  school,  separately  for  parents  of  children  born  either  side  of  the  1 
September  cut-off.  If  there  were  no  effect  of  eligibility  for  full-time  primary  education 
(relative to part-time nursery education) on off-flow rates from welfare (and no difference 
in  characteristics  between  the  two  groups),  then  we  would  expect  minimal  differences 
between the lines. On the other hand, if eligibility for full-time primary education did have 
an effect (and there were no differences in other characteristics), then we would expect the 
lines to diverge during the period in which the older children are eligible and the younger 
ones are not, before coming together again when the younger children become eligible. (If 
there were anticipation effects, then we might expect the lines to diverge before the older 
children become eligible.) Figure 5 suggests that the welfare receipt rates amongst lone 
parents of older and younger children are almost identical until about three months after 
the  older  children  become  eligible  to  start  school,  at  which  point  there  is  a  (small) 
divergence, which begins to tail off around six months after the younger children become 
eligible. This suggests that there are no (or at least no differential) anticipation effects, and 
would be consistent with, for example,  parents not starting to look for work until their 
youngest child starts school, giving rise to a lag before the rates of welfare receipt diverge.
35 
                                                           
35 It would also be consistent with a scenario in which (some) children attend school part-time (rather than 
full-time) for the first few months while they “settle in”. Authors’ calculations based on the Millennium Cohort 
Study (which follows a cohort of children born in Great Britain who we would expect to start school in 2005-21 
 
 
Table 4 then shows estimates of α0 from equation (3) based on the same sample, and Figure 
6 plots these estimates graphically along with the 95% confidence interval. These results 
suggest  that  eligibility  for  full-time  primary  education  (relative  to  part-time  nursery 
education) has a small but significant effect on lone parents’ welfare receipt from around six 
months  after  their  youngest  child  becomes  eligible,  peaking  at  1.9  percentage  points 
(around 10 per cent) nine months after the child first becomes eligible, before falling away 
to approximately zero after 14 months: this is unsurprising, as all children are now eligible 




Figures  7  and  8  and  Table  5  repeat  this  analysis  for  employment  outcomes.
  Figure  7 
highlights  the  likely  over-estimation  of  the  proportion  of  lone  parents  in  employment 
discussed in Section 3: around 13 per cent of lone parents were apparently in employment 
when sampled, when we know that they were also claiming Income Support, and therefore 
highly likely to be out of work.
38 It also shows that the effect of eligibility for full-time 
primary  education  (relative  to  part-time  nursery  education)  on  employment  outcomes 
appears to kick in just after the lone parents’ youngest child starts school. Moreover, this 
effect is larger – and lasts for longer – than the effect on welfare receipt discussed above. 
Table  5  and  Figure  8  show  that  the  effect  of  eligibility  for  full-time  primary  education 
                                                                                                                                                                                      
06) suggest that around 46% of children in Policy 1 areas in England start school part-time rather than full-time 
(25% do so in Policy 2 areas), with the vast majority (just under 75%) attending part-time for less than two 
months.  
36 Of course, after month 12, our estimates cannot be interpreted as the impact of eligibility for full-time 
education as all children are now eligible: instead, they estimate the difference between being entitled for 
M+12 and M months. 
37 We do not show the other coefficients, mostly because there are dozens of regressions each with dozens of 
regressors. Choosing the outcome with the largest estimated impact (nine months after eligibility for welfare 
receipt), the other coefficients suggest that lone parents with more than one child, those of Chinese or mixed 
ethnic origin (relative to whites), those who have spent a smaller proportion of the past three years in work 
and off benefit, those who receive relatively more Income Support, those who have never participated in the 
New Deal for Lone Parents (NDLP), those who are also claiming Incapacity Benefit, those who have been 
disabled in the past three years, and those who live in areas with high unemployment rates are less likely to be 
off benefit; conversely lone parents of Black ethnic origin are more likely to be off benefit than whites. A full 
set of coefficient estimates is available from the authors on request. 
38 While it is possible for lone parents to be in work and still entitled to Income Support, after a small earnings 
disregard (£20 a week), there is a 100% withdrawal rate. Jobs paying less than £20 a week are highly unlikely 
to be recorded in the administrative data as they are far below the personal allowance (and therefore not 
liable for income tax). 22 
 
(relative to part-time nursery education) on the likelihood of a lone parent being in paid 
employment  peaks  at  2.4  percentage  points  (around  13  per  cent)  eight  months  after 
eligibility,  before  falling  away  to  approximately  zero  a further  five  months  later  (as the 
younger children also become eligible).
39 This suggests that Gelbach (2002) and Fitzpatrick 
(2010) may have slightly under-estimated the effect of attending (pre-) kindergarten on 
mothers’  labour  supply  by  observing  outcomes  relatively  soon  (five  and  seven  months, 
respectively) after school entry. 
 
 
Policy  2 areas 
 
There  are  two  distinct  cut-offs  in  Policy  2  areas.  First,  as  in  Policy  1  areas,  there  is  a 
discontinuity around 1 September. In Policy 2 areas, however, the older children are eligible 
to  start  school  eight  months  earlier  than  the  younger  children  (in  January  rather  than 
September of the previous year). Second, there is a discontinuity around 1 March, where 
the older children (those born in January and February in our main specification) are eligible 
to start school four months earlier than the younger children (those born in March and April 
in our main specification) – in September rather than the following January. 
 
Tables 6 and 7 present estimates of the effect of youngest child being born just before 
rather than just after the 1 September and 1 March cut-offs in Policy 2 areas respectively on 
the proportion of lone parents off welfare and in employment. For these groups, we find no 
consistent or significant effects of eligibility for full-time primary education (relative to part-
time  nursery  education)  on  either  welfare  receipt  or  employment  rates.  While  it  is 
disappointing that these results do not clearly support our findings from the Policy 1 areas, 
both the shorter period over which to observe any effects, and the considerably smaller 
sample sizes, may provide at least a partial explanation. 
                                                           
39 Choosing the outcome with the largest estimated impact (eight months after eligibility for employment), the 
other coefficients suggest that older, male lone parents, those with four or more children, those of Asian or 
other ethnic origin (relative to whites), those who have spent a smaller proportion of the past three years in 
work, those who receive relatively more Income Support, those who have never been on NDLP, those who 
have been disabled in the past three years, and those who live in areas with a high claimant count are less 
likely to be in employment; conversely lone parents of black ethnic origin are more likely to be in employment 
than whites. A full set of coefficient estimates is available from the authors on request.  23 
 
Effect of  eligibility   for part-time nursery education 
 
Appendix  B  presents  estimates  of  the  effect  on  lone  parents’  employment  and  welfare 
receipt of their youngest child being born either side of the 1 September discontinuity in 
Policy  1  and  2  areas  using  our  two  samples.  (Results  for  the  1  January  and  1  March 
discontinuities  are  available  on  request.)  While  there  is  little  evidence  of  an  effect  of 
eligibility for part-time nursery  education  on  lone parents’  labour  supply  using  our  first 
sample, there does appear to be a significant effect amongst lone parents in our second 
sample. For example, three months after their youngest child becomes eligible for part-time 
nursery education, parents of older children in Policy 1 areas are 1.7 percentage points 
more likely to be off welfare than parents of younger children in Policy 1 areas. There also 
seem to be some significant effects on employment outcomes amongst lone parents in both 
Policy 1 and Policy 2 areas, although it is not clear whether these are lagged effects of 






We now move on to assess whether the effects of youngest child’s eligibility for full-time 
primary education (relative to part-time nursery education) on the labour supply of low 
income lone parents varies according to the characteristics of the lone parent. In particular, 
we  consider  whether  it  differs  by:  1)  length  of  welfare  claim  at  sample  entry;  2)  past 
participation in a particular voluntary welfare-to-work programme, the New Deal for Lone 
Parents (NDLP); 3) local employment rate; 4) number of children; 5) ethnicity; 6) disability 
status. Results for the 1 September discontinuity in Policy 1 areas by claim length and NDLP 
participation can be found in Appendix C; all other results are available from the authors on 
request. 
 
We find that lone parents who have previously been on NDLP and those whose welfare 
claim has lasted for less than 12 months at the point of sample entry are more responsive to 
the childcare subsidy provided by entitlement to full-time primary education (relative to 24 
 
part-time nursery education) than lone parents who have never previously been on NDLP or 
whose  welfare  claim  has  lasted  at  least  12  months  at  sample entry.  For  example, nine 
months  after  eligibility  begins,  lone  parents  whose  youngest  child  is  born  immediately 
before the 1 September discontinuity in Policy 1 areas are around 4.3 percentage points 
more likely to be off welfare than lone parents whose youngest child is born immediately 
after the 1 September discontinuity if they have ever been on NDLP, compared to only 1.6 
percentage points if they have not. Similarly, eight months after eligibility, the effect on 
employment  outcomes  amongst  lone  parents  who  have  ever  been  on  NDLP  is  5.7 
percentage points, compared to 2.0 percentage points amongst those who have not. In both 
cases, the estimates are significantly different from each other, and the differences by claim 
length are broadly similar. 
 
Brewer et al (2009) similarly found that the impact of a wage supplement was greater for 
lone  parents  who  had  previously  participated  in  NDLP  than  those  who  had  not.  They 
suggested that this greater response could be because lone parents on NDLP were more 
likely to hear about the wage supplement, or that, since NDLP is a voluntary programme, 
those who sign up are lone parents with a greater underlying propensity to work and a 
greater responsiveness to financial incentives to work.  In this case, it is not very likely that a 
lone parent could be unaware that their child was entitled to full-time primary education, 
and so the higher impact amongst lone parents participating in NDLP seems likely to be a 
selection effect. This would also be a plausible explanation for the differences by claim 
length.  
 
By contrast, we do not find any significant differences in the effect of eligibility for full-time 
primary education (relative to part-time nursery education) on lone parents’ labour supply 
by local employment rate, number of children, ethnicity or disability status. 
 
 




We  carry  out  specification  checks  on  our  choice  of  sample  window,  our  choice  of  age 
specification and  our decision to  include children born up to a week either side of the 
discontinuity in our analysis. 
 
To ensure that our choice of sample window does not affect our results, we have run the 
same analysis on welfare receipt and employment outcomes using children born up to 14, 
30 and 90 days either side of the discontinuity (results for the 1 September discontinuity in 
Policy 1 areas are shown in Tables D1 to D3 of Appendix D; results for Policy 2 areas are 
available from the authors on request). These figures suggest that our finding of a small but 
significant effect of eligibility for full-time primary education (relative to part-time nursery 
education) on parental labour supply is not materially affected by our choice of sample 
window.  
 
Similarly, to ensure that our choice of age specification does not affect our results, we have 
run the same analysis using age squared (allowing it to have different slopes either side of 
the discontinuity). Results for the 1 September discontinuity in Policy 1 areas are shown in 
Table D4 in Appendix D; results for Policy 2 areas are available from the authors on request. 
These figures suggest that our findings are not materially affected by our choice of age 
specification;  while  the  standard  errors  increase  (a  common  finding),  the  basic  pattern 
remains the same, particularly for welfare receipt. (We have also run specifications using 
age and age squared without interacting them with the treatment effect, which makes very 
little difference to our findings.) 
 
As  discussed  in  Section  3,  slightly  more  children  are  born  immediately  before  than 
immediately after the 1 September discontinuity. To ensure that this  discrepancy is not 
biasing our results, we run the same analysis omitting children born up to a week either side 
of the discontinuity. Results for Policy 1 areas are shown in Table D5 in Appendix D; results 
for Policy 2 areas are available from the authors on request. These figures suggest that our 
findings are not unduly biased by the inclusion of children born up to a week either side of 





To check the validity of our results, we ran a series of placebo tests. First, we compared 
outcomes amongst parents of children who are either too young or too old to be affected by 
the school entry discontinuity: in particular, we sampled children about to turn two, six and 
ten (rather than about to turn four, as in our main specification). Those turning two are too 
young to be eligible for either full-time primary education or part-time nursery education, 
and those turning six or ten are already in full-time primary education, so there are no 
discontinuities caused by school admissions policies; we would therefore expect to see no 
difference in outcomes for these individuals.
40 Second, we compared outcomes amongst 
parents of children whose youngest child is turning four, but who are born either side of a 
discontinuity which has no bearing on school entry. For example, we examine the effects of 
being born either side of 1 March cut-off in Policy 1 areas (where it has no bearing on school 
entry).  
 
Tables E1, E2 and E3 in Appendix E compare outcomes amongst parents whose youngest 
child is turning two, six or ten respectively, and who are born up to 60 days either side of 
the 1 September cut-off in Policy 1 areas
41, while Table E4 compares outcomes amongst 
parents  whose  youngest  child  is  turning  four  and  is  born  either  immediately  before  or 
immediately  after  1  March  cut-off  in  Policy  1  areas.  We  find  virtually  no  difference  in 
welfare receipt or employment outcomes for any of these groups.
42 As such, these results 
provide reassurance that our main finding of a small but significant effect of entitlement to 
full-time primary education (relative to part-time nursery education) on welfare receipt and 
employment outcomes amongst low income lone parents is valid. 
 
 
   
                                                           
40 Entitlement to benefits and tax credits for children is constant for children aged 1 to 16. 
41 Results for Policy 2 areas are available from the authors on request. 
42 The significant differences in employment rates towards the end of the period of interest amongst lone 
parents whose youngest child is turning two are likely to reflect differences in eligibility for full-time primary 




How do our findings compare to those of the handful of other studies that have sought to 




Gelbach (2002) studied the impact of children aged four to five starting full-time education 
in 1980 in the US on their mothers’ labour supply. He found that free public schooling 
increased measures of labour supply amongst lone mothers with no younger children by 
between 6 and 24 percent, and reduced welfare receipt by 10 percent, but that there was 
no statistically significant impact on lone mothers with a younger child.
44 The estimated 
impact on the outcomes closest to ours suggest that employment in the week before the 
Census rose by 5 percentage points (equivalent to a 10 percent rise in the number of lone 
mothers in work) and that the fraction who received welfare in the previous year fell by 4 
percentage points (also a 10 percent rise).
45 Fitzpatrick (2009) repeats this analysis using the 
2000 Census and finds significant impacts on maternal labour supply only for lone mothers 
with no younger children. 
 
Fitzpatrick  (2010)  studies  the  impact  of  universal  entitlement  to  free  pre-K  on  various 
measures of mothers’ labour supply in Georgia and Oklahoma.
46 She finds that entitlement 
to pre-K increases pre-school enrolment by 7.2 percentage points, or 12-14 percent, but 
that it has little discernable impact on maternal employment; for both findings, there are no 
statistically significant differences between lone mothers and married mothers.
47 Berlinksi 
                                                           
43 As we mentioned above, there are many papers which attempt to estimate the link between the price of 
formal childcare (usually for pre-school children) and maternal employment: see Blau & Currie (2004) for a 
review, and Brewer & Paull (2004) for a discussion of what these mean for the UK. 
44 The impact on married women  was between 6 and 15 percent, and varied little  with the presence of 
younger children. 
45 The fractions of lone mothers whose youngest child is aged 5 who are in work or on welfare in the US in 
1980 are very similar to those of the same group in the UK in the mid-2000s. 
46 Pre-K or pre-kindergarten is part-time (2.5 hours/day) or full-time (6 hours/day) during the school year and is 
intended for four year-olds. A UK equivalent would be somewhere between the entitlement to nursery places 
for three and four year olds and reception classes in infant schools. 
47 She suggests two reasons for the smaller impact found in  her study compared to Gelbach’s: first, that 
mothers’  employment  decisions  have  become  less  responsive  to  financial  incentives  as  the  maternal 
employment rate has risen (she uses data from 1999/2000 rather than 1979/1980, as in Gelbach’s paper); 
second, that government support for all forms of childcare has increased, meaning that there is less difference 28 
 
et al (2009) study a similar set-up in Argentina, again exploiting date-of-birth cut-offs which 
mean that children aged around five and born 1 day apart will be entitled to free pre-
primary school a year apart.
48 They find that entitlement to pre-primary education increases 
enrolment  by  just  under  30  percentage  points,  and  that  it  increases  the  proportion  of 
mothers in work by just under 4 percentage points (the mean employment rate of the 
sample  is  37%):  this  means  that,  for  every  100  children  who  start  pre-primary  school 
because  of  this  reform,  around  13  (the  ratio  of  these  two  estimates,  or  0.038/0.299) 
mothers move into work, although this is not significantly different from zero.  
 
We are not aware of any studies that have attempted to estimate the impact of starting 
school using UK data. The study coming closest is Brewer & Paull (2006), which examined 
the  impact  of  a  child  turning  five  on  maternal  labour  supply  and  a  wide  range  of 
employment characteristics. They used longitudinal data on children born in the 1990s and 
early  2000s  to  examine  changes  in  maternal  labour  supply  and  a  range  of  work 
characteristics as children aged.  They find that the maternal employment rate rises by 3.4 
percentage points (4.7 percentage points for lone mothers) over a 15 month period during 
which children start school, almost all of which is due to families whose last child is starting 
school (their Table 5.7). On the other hand, they also show that the maternal (and paternal) 
work dynamics around the time of school entry seem little different to those experienced by 
parents of slightly younger or slightly older children: in other words, the rise in maternal 
employment  over  this  period  could  simply  be  a  general  response  to  the  aging  of  the 
youngest child, rather than a specific response to the start of school. 
 
It  is  interesting  to  compare  the  impacts  reported  in  this  paper  to  those  of  welfare 
programmes affecting lone parents or changes to the rules of welfare benefits for lone 
parents in the UK. A partial summary of the estimated impact of welfare reforms affecting 
lone parents is given in Cebulla et al (2008), and Brewer et al (2009) estimated the impact of 
a temporary wage supplement programme for lone parents (known as “In Work Credit”).  
                                                                                                                                                                                      
in the childcare available to children who were and were not eligible to free pre-K in 2000 than there was 
between that available to children who were and were not eligible to free public schooling in 1980. 
48 Berlinski et al (2009) report that these are generally part-time sessions (3.5 hours a day), available 5 days a 
week in the school year, and generally within existing primary schools. A UK equivalent would be nursery 
classes in state-run infant or primary schools. 29 
 
 
We  find  that,  amongst  those  receiving  welfare  when  their  youngest  children  is  aged 
approximately three and a half, eligibility for full-time primary education (relative to part-
time  nursery  education)  increases  the  proportion  of  lone  parents  off  welfare  and  in 
employment by a small but significant margin that peaks at around 2 percentage points (or 
10-15 per cent) eight to nine months after the child becomes eligible (aged approximately 4 
years and 9 months). Brewer et al (2009) report that, after 12 months of being potentially 
eligible for a wage supplement, an additional 1.6 percentage points of potentially eligible 
lone parents had left welfare, and after 24 months, the figure was 2.0 percentage points.  
Cebulla et al (2008) calculated the impact of the New Deal for Lone Parents – a voluntary 
programme  featuring personalised  support and  advice  – on all  lone parents  on  welfare 
benefits to be 1.7 percentage points after nine months and 1.4 percentage points after two 
years.  They also reported that, after 12 months, the impact of Work Focused Interviews 
(WFIs) was 0.8 per cent for lone parents with youngest children aged over 13 and 2.0 per 
cent for lone parents with youngest children aged 9–12.
49 Eligibility for full-time primary 
education seems, therefore, to have an impact broadly comparable to these three welfare-
to-work programmes, but at vastly greater cost, not least because the full-time primary 
education places were provided to all (or almost all) of the lone parents on welfare, but only 
a small minority of lone parents on welfare actually moved into work and took up the wage 
supplement. (Of course, it should be remembered that helping lone parents into work is not 
the primary aim of the provision of free public education.)    
 
 
   
                                                           
49 Cebulla et al (2008) discussed extensively the difficulties involved in making direct comparisons, given the 
different approaches taken by the original evaluations, but these results are as comparable as they can be 
given the published data. Importantly, all express the intention to treat: they are the estimated impact on 
those lone parents who were exposed to the treatment, where the treatments are: a child’s entitlement to 
full-time primary education; eligibility for a wage supplement were they to enter work; eligibility to volunteer 
for  the  NDLP;  and  a  requirement  to  attend  an  annual  Work  Focused  Interview.  However,  the  estimated 
impacts of the three programmes are all for slightly different populations: the IWC estimates are for all lone 
parents whose welfare claim reaches 12 months, the NDLP estimate is for all lone parents on IS in Great 
Britain, and the WFI estimates are for the stock of lone parents on IS with children of various ages. 30 
 
5  Conclusions 
 
 
In this paper, we have argued that we can identify the causal impact of youngest child’s 
eligibility for part-time nursery education and full-time primary education on the labour 
supply of low income lone parents by comparing outcomes of lone parents whose youngest 
child is born either side of cut-offs which determine eligibility to start school or nursery. 
Using a regression discontinuity approach, we find that, amongst those receiving welfare 
when their youngest children is aged approximately three and a half, eligibility for full-time 
primary education (relative to part-time nursery education) increases the proportion of lone 
parents off welfare and in employment by a small but significant margin that peaks (at 
around 2 percentage points, or 10-15 per cent) eight to nine months after the child becomes 
eligible (aged approximately 4 years and 9 months). Moreover, we find that these effects do 
not start to emerge until some four to six months after school entry, which suggests that 
lone parents may not start looking for work until their youngest child is eligible for school. 
This  indicates  that  some  previous  estimates  (notably  those  of  Gelbach,  2002,  and 
Fitzpatrick,  2010)  may  slightly  under-estimate  the  effect  of  (pre-)kindergarten  entry  on 
mothers’  labour  supply  by  considering  outcomes  measured  seven  and  five  months 
respectively after the children start school. Amongst those receiving welfare when their 
youngest child is aged approximately two and a half, we find weaker evidence of a smaller 
effect of eligibility for part-time nursery education on the proportion of lone parents off 
welfare or in employment.  
 
It  is  worth  noting,  however,  that  both  of  these  effects  are  small  in  comparison  to  the 
proportion of lone parents with children around school or nursery entry age who are leaving 
welfare and entering employment over time anyway. This is perhaps surprising, given that 
we are focusing on what might be regarded as a relatively responsive group (and a group for 
whom other authors – for example, Cascio (2009) and Fitzpatrick (2009) – have found the 
largest  effects),  although  it  is  worth pointing  out that  there  may  be  relatively few  jobs 
available to lone parents  that fall entirely within school hours. Nonetheless, our results 
suggest  that  the  expansion  of  public  education  programmes  to  younger  disadvantaged 
children – such as the policy of extending free nursery education to disadvantaged two year 31 
 
olds which has just been announced by the UK government (in October 2010) – may only 
encourage a small number of low income lone parents to return to work (although, of 
course, this is not its primary aim). 
 
As we were conducting this research, the new (from May 2010) UK government announced 
a plan to remove entitlement for Income Support from lone parents whose youngest child 
was aged 5 or over (compared with the previous government’s plan to do this for lone 
parents whose youngest child was aged 7 or over); this will mean that non-working lone 
parents who are not eligible for disability benefits will have to claim Jobseekers Allowance, a 
welfare benefit with job-search requirements backed up with the threat of sanctions for 
non-compliance.
50 Our findings are clearly pertinent to this decision: eligibility for full-time 
primary  education  (corresponding  to  a  relatively  large  childcare  subsidy)  does  not 
precipitate a large increase in labour market activity amongst this group. On the other hand, 
proponents of the move to require lone parents to seek work as a condition of receiving 
welfare benefits when their children are of school age might well say that the relatively 
small impacts found in our study mostly result from the lack of obligation to look for work 
that existed at the time our data was collected.   
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Table 1  Selected characteristics of lone parents whose youngest child is born up to 60 days 
either side of the relevant cut - off
 
  Parents of older 
children 
Parents of younger 
children 
Difference 
  1 September cut-off in Policy 1 areas 
Male  0.029  0.027  0.002 
Number of children  2.010  1.985  0.025* 
Age   29.840  29.483  0.357** 
Non-white  0.125  0.125  0.000 
Work history  0.156  0.158  -0.002 
Welfare history  0.104  0.103  0.002 
Disabled  0.057  0.057  0.000 
Local employment rate  0.656  0.656  0.000 
  23,181  23,992   
  1 September cut-off in Policy 2 areas 
Male  0.028  0.025  0.003 
Number of children  2.033  2.012  0.021 
Age   30.574  30.268  0.306** 
Non-white  0.234  0.250  -0.016* 
Work history  0.149  0.146  0.003 
Welfare history  0.093  0.098  -0.005 
Disabled  0.052  0.054  -0.001 
Local employment rate  0.632  0.63  0.002 
  8,745  9,051   
  1 March cut-off in Policy 2 areas 
Male  0.035  0.033  0.002 
Number of children  2.037  2.040  -0.003 
Age   31.288  31.139  0.149 
Non-white  0.238  0.226  0.012 
Work history  0.148  0.146  0.002 
Welfare history  0.092  0.096  -0.004 
Disabled  0.055  0.053  0.002 
Local employment rate  0.63  0.632  -0.002 
  8,267  7,998   
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on administrative data.  
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Table 2  Sample size by age for 1 September cut-off in Policy   1 and 2 areas using 60 day window
 
 








Sample size  91,537  (1) 65,534  
(2) 41,581 
48,752  30,335 
Source: authors’ calculations based on administrative data. Note: we make use of two samples of parents whose 
youngest child is turning three: 1) parents whose youngest child turned three between 2001 and 2004 in the 63 local 
authorities that received early funding to provide free part-time nursery places; 2) parents whose youngest child 
turned three in 2004 or 2005 in all local authorities. 
 
 
Table 3  Sample size by policy area, cut-off and window 
 
  Policy 1 areas  Policy 2 areas 
  1 September cut-off  1 September cut-off  1 March cut-off 
14 day window  11,060  4,088  3,766 
30 day window  23,857  8,883  8,120 
60 day window  47,173  17,796  16,265 
90 day window  70,368  26,425  24,309 
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on administrative data. 
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Table 4  Effect on proportion of lone parents off benefit of  youngest child being born immediately
 























-6  3y, 6m  0.00007  6  4y, 6m  0.017**  18  5y, 6m  0.005 
    [0.002]      [0.006]      [0.007] 
-5  3y, 7m  0.005  7  4y, 7m  0.016**  19  5y, 7m  -0.001 
    [0.003]      [0.006]      [0.007] 
-4  3y, 8m  0.0003  8  4y, 8m  0.018**  20  5y, 8m  0.0004 
    [0.004]      [0.006]      [0.007] 
-3  3y, 9m  0.0003  9  4y, 9m  0.019**  21  5y, 9m  -0.001 
    [0.004]      [0.005]      [0.007] 
-2  3y, 10m  -0.0008  10  4y, 10m  0.018**  22  5y, 10m  -0.003 
    [0.004]      [0.006]      [0.008] 
-1  3y, 11m  -0.003  11  4y, 11m  0.016**  23  5y, 11m  -0.001 
    [0.004]      [0.006]      [0.007] 
0  4y, 0m  -0.007  12  5y, 0m  0.015*  24  6y, 0m  0.001 
    [0.004]      [0.006]      [0.008] 
1  4y, 1m  -0.005  13  5y, 1m  0.012*  25  6y, 1m  -0.004 
    [0.005]      [0.006]      [0.008] 
2  4y, 2m  0.005  14  5y, 2m  0.009  26  6y, 2m  -0.005 
    [0.005]      [0.007]      [0.008] 
3  4y, 3m  0.006  15  5y, 3m  0.010  27  6y, 3m  -0.003 
    [0.005]      [0.006]      [0.008] 
4  4y, 4m  0.008  16  5y, 4m  0.004  28  6y, 4m  -0.003 
    [0.006]      [0.007]      [0.007] 
5  4y, 5m  0.010  17  5y, 5m  0.005  29  6y, 5m  -0.00007 
    [0.006]      [0.007]      [0.007] 
 
Estimates from a series of linear probability models which also include controls for: gender, ethnicity, age, number of 
children, age of youngest child relative to cut-off, day of week of birth of youngest child, whether youngest child born 
on a bank holiday, employment and welfare histories, an indicator for the amount of Income Support received (as a 
proxy for income), past participation in a particular voluntary welfare-to-work programme (the New Deal for Lone 
Parents), an indicator of disability, the proportion of formal childcare places available in the lone parents’ local area, 
their local area deprivation score, their local unemployment rate, the proportion of lone parents in their local area 
who are professionals (as a proxy for their own socio-economic status), and the proportion of workless lone parents in 
their area with particular education levels (as a proxy for their own education level). We also include a set of local 
authority dummies and a set of cohort dummies. Full details of all coefficient estimates are available from the authors 
on request. Standard errors are robust, clustered by day of birth and shown in parentheses. These estimates are 
plotted in Figure 6. 
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Table 5  Effect on proportion of lone parents in employment of youngest child being born immediately
 























-6  3y, 6m  0.012**  6  4y, 6m  0.022**  18  5y, 6m  0.0008 
    [0.004]      [0.005]      [0.007] 
-5  3y, 7m  0.009*  7  4y, 7m  0.023**  19  5y, 7m  0.004 
    [0.004]      [0.006]      [0.007] 
-4  3y, 8m  0.006  8  4y, 8m  0.024**  20  5y, 8m  0.007 
    [0.004]      [0.006]      [0.007] 
-3  3y, 9m  0.009  9  4y, 9m  0.021**  21  5y, 9m  0.008 
    [0.005]      [0.006]      [0.007] 
-2  3y, 10m  0.007  10  4y, 10m  0.018**  22  5y, 10m  0.004 
    [0.005]      [0.007]      [0.007] 
-1  3y, 11m  0.007  11  4y, 11m  0.019**  23  5y, 11m  0.001 
    [0.006]      [0.007]      [0.007] 
0  4y, 0m  0.009  12  5y, 0m  0.016*  24  6y, 0m  0.001 
    [0.005]      [0.007]      [0.007] 
1  4y, 1m  0.011*  13  5y, 1m  0.008  25  6y, 1m  0.002 
    [0.005]      [0.006]      [0.007] 
2  4y, 2m  0.013*  14  5y, 2m  0.010  26  6y, 2m  0.001 
    [0.005]      [0.006]      [0.007] 
3  4y, 3m  0.011  15  5y, 3m  0.008  27  6y, 3m  0.003 
    [0.006]      [0.006]      [0.008] 
4  4y, 4m  0.017**  16  5y, 4m  0.006  28  6y, 4m  0.0004 
    [0.005]      [0.006]      [0.008] 
5  4y, 5m  0.018**  17  5y, 5m  0.0009  29  6y, 5m  0.0006 
    [0.005]      [0.006]      [0.008] 
 
See notes to Table 4. These estimates are plotted in Figure 8. 
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Table 6  Effect of youngest child being born immediately  before (rather than immediately after)





Effect on % 
off benefit 
Effect on 












Effect on % 
off benefit 
Effect on % 
in work 
-6  0.005  -0.0006  6  -0.012  0.009  18  -0.023  0.005 
  [0.003]  [0.005]    [0.011]  [0.010]    [0.012]  [0.010] 
-5  0.003  -0.003  7  -0.014  0.012  19  -0.019  0.006 
  [0.005]  [0.007]    [0.010]  [0.010]    [0.013]  [0.010] 
-4  0.003  -0.007  8  -0.010  0.009  20  -0.024  0.001 
  [0.006]  [0.008]    [0.011]  [0.011]    [0.013]  [0.011] 
-3  -0.002  -0.007  9  -0.013  0.015  21  -0.021  -0.003 
  [0.006]  [0.008]    [0.012]  [0.011]    [0.013]  [0.010] 
-2  -0.004  -0.008  10  -0.018  0.012  22  -0.018  -0.011 
  [0.007]  [0.008]    [0.012]  [0.010]    [0.013]  [0.010] 
-1  -0.005  -0.010  11  -0.017  0.014  23  -0.021  -0.008 
  [0.008]  [0.008]    [0.011]  [0.010]    [0.013]  [0.010] 
0  -0.008  -0.005  12  -0.012  0.010  24  -0.021  -0.005 
  [0.009]  [0.009]    [0.011]  [0.010]    [0.014]  [0.010] 
1  -0.006  -0.007  13  -0.015  0.014  25  -0.026  -0.008 
  [0.009]  [0.009]    [0.011]  [0.010]    [0.014]  [0.011] 
2  -0.009  -0.009  14  -0.018  0.010  26  -0.023  0.0007 
  [0.009]  [0.009]    [0.011]  [0.010]    [0.014]  [0.010] 
3  -0.012  -0.010  15  -0.015  0.009  27  -0.028  0.0005 
  [0.009]  [0.009]    [0.011]  [0.010]    [0.014]  [0.011] 
4  -0.014  0.0004  16  -0.013  0.004  28  -0.022  -0.003 
  [0.009]  [0.009]    [0.011]  [0.010]    [0.014]  [0.011] 
5  -0.008  0.005  17  -0.022  0.003  29  -0.028  0.0008 
  [0.010]  [0.010]    [0.011]  [0.010]    [0.015]  [0.011] 
 
See notes to Table 4. 
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Table 7   Effect of youngest child being born immediately  before ( rather than immediately after)  

























% in work 
-6  0.0003  0.009  6  -0.007  0.0002  18  0.006  -0.004 
  [0.004]  [0.005]    [0.011]  [0.010]    [0.015]  [0.010] 
-5  -0.009  0.010  7  -0.014  -0.002  19  0.004  0.006 
  [0.006]  [0.007]    [0.013]  [0.011]    [0.014]  [0.010] 
-4  -0.003  0.013  8  -0.004  -0.009  20  0.004  0.007 
  [0.007]  [0.008]    [0.013]  [0.011]    [0.014]  [0.010] 
-3  -0.004  0.010  9  -0.005  -0.008  21  -0.004  0.009 
  [0.007]  [0.008]    [0.013]  [0.011]    [0.015]  [0.010] 
-2  0.007  0.004  10  0.0005  -0.011  22  0.007  0.014 
  [0.008]  [0.008]    [0.014]  [0.011]    [0.015]  [0.011] 
-1  0.007  0.005  11  0.004  -0.006  23  0.002  0.015 
  [0.008]  [0.008]    [0.014]  [0.011]    [0.015]  [0.012] 
0  0.004  0.007  12  0.007  -0.003  24  0.007  0.014 
  [0.009]  [0.008]    [0.014]  [0.011]    [0.016]  [0.012] 
1  0.003  0.009  13  0.001  -0.008  25  0.013  0.014 
  [0.010]  [0.009]    [0.014]  [0.011]    [0.016]  [0.011] 
2  0.002  0.014  14  0.002  -0.007  26  0.014  0.011 
  [0.011]  [0.010]    [0.015]  [0.011]    [0.015]  [0.011] 
3  0.001  0.009  15  0.002  -0.009  27  0.016  0.010 
  [0.010]  [0.011]    [0.014]  [0.011]    [0.015]  [0.011] 
4  -0.004  -0.003  16  0.004  -0.005  28  0.014  0.010 
  [0.011]  [0.010]    [0.015]  [0.011]    [0.015]  [0.011] 
5  -0.005  -0.007  17  0.007  -0.004  29  0.014  0.018 
  [0.011]  [0.009]    [0.014]  [0.010]    [0.014]  [0.011] 
 
See notes to Table 4. 
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Figure 1  Employment rate amongst lone parent by age of youngest child 2001-02 to 2003-04  
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on Family Resources Survey, April 2001 to March 2004. 
 
 





Source: authors’ calculations based on Family Resources Survey, April 2001 to March 2004. 
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Figure 3a  Actual school start dates of children eligible for free school meals who we expect to 




Figure 3b  Actual school start dates of children eligible for free school meals who we expect to 
start school in September in Policy  2 areas in England between 2001-02 and 2004-05
 
Notes to Figures 3a-c: authors’ calculations based on school census data from 2001-02 to 2004-05. Community schools 
(64% of the sample) are required to follow the local authority admissions policy, while non-community schools (36%) 
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Figure 3c  Actual school start dates of children eligible for free school meals who we expect to 
start school in January in Policy 2 areas in England between 2001-02 and 2004-05 
 
 
See notes above. 
 
Figure 4  Density  of birthdates in our main sample 
 
Figure shows number of children in our main sample born on each day relative to 1 September, accounting for the day 
of the week on which the child was born and whether they were born on a bank holiday (of which there is one at the 
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Figure 5  Proportion off welfare: comparing parents of children born up to 60  days before and 
after the 1 September cut-off in Policy   1 areas 
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on administrative data. 
 
 
Figure 6  Effect on proportion of lone parents off welfare of youngest child being born 
immediately  before (rather than immediately  after)  1 September cut-off in Policy  1 areas 
 
Source: estimates from a series of linear probability models which also include a full set of controls (see Table 4 for 
details). 














































































































Figure 7   Proportion in employment: comparing parents of children born up to 60 days before 
and after the 1 September cut-off in Policy  1 areas 
 
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on administrative data. 
 
 
Figure 8   Effect on proportion of lone parents in employment of youngest child being born 
immediately before (rather than immediately after) 1 September cut-off in Policy 1 areas 
 
Source: estimates from a series of linear probability models which also include a full set of controls (see Table 5 for 

















































































































Appendix  A - Relationship Between Youngest Child’s Date Of Birth And Other Characteristics 
Amongst Main Sample Of Lone Parents 
 
Figure A1  Age of lone parent in our main sample 
 
Figure shows age of lone parent  when sampled for children in our main sample born on each day relative to 1 
September (1=31 August). Figure also shows a linear trend estimated separately either side of 1 September cut-off. 
 
Figure A2  Proportion of previous 18  months not on welfare in our main sample 
 
Figure shows proportion of 18 months before sampling that lone parent did not spend on welfare for children in our 
main sample born on each day relative to 1 September (1=31 August). Figure also shows a linear trend estimated 
separately either side of 1 September cut-off. 
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Figure A3  Proportion of previous 18 months in employment in our main sample 
 
 
Figure shows proportion of 18 months before sampling that lone parent spent in employment for children in our main 
sample born on each day relative to 1 September (1=31 August). Figure also shows a linear trend estimated separately 
either side of 1 September cut-off. 
 
 
Figure A4  Whether ever received a disability  benefit in previous 18 months in our main sample 
 
 
Figure shows whether lone parent ever received a disability benefit in 18 months before sampling for children in our 
main sample born on each day relative to 1 September (1=31 August). Figure also shows a linear trend estimated 
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Figure A5  Whether male in our main sample 
 
 
Figure shows proportion of lone parents who are male for children in our main sample born each day relative to 1 
September (1=31 August). Figure also shows a linear trend estimated separately either side of 1 September cut-off. 
 
Figure A6  Whether non-white or missing ethnicity  
 
 
Figure shows proportion of lone parents with specified ethnicity for children in our main sample born on each day 
relative to 1 September (1=31 August). Top line is fraction whose ethnicity is not known; bottom line is fraction (of 
whole  sample)  with  non-white  ethnicity.  Figure  also  shows  a  linear  trend  estimated  separately  either  side  of  1 
September cut-off. 
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Figure A7  Local employment rate in our main sample 
 
 
Figure also shows a linear trend estimated separately either side of 1 September cut-off (1=31 August). 








-60 -55 -50 -45 -40 -35 -30 -25 -20 -15 -10 -5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60
Date of birth relative to 1 September50 
 
Appendix  B 
Effect Of Eligibility For Part-Time Nursery Education 
 
Table B1  Effect of youngest child being born before (rather than after)  1 September cut-off 
determining eligibility for part-time nursery education in Policy 1 areas, using sample of parents 
whose youngest child turns three between 2001 and 2004 and who live in local authorities given 








Effect on % 
off benefit 










Effect on % 
in work 
-6  2y, 6m  0.0004  -0.006  3  3y, 3m  0.009  0.00008 
    [0.002]  [0.003]      [0.006]  [0.006] 
-5  2y, 7m  0.0005  0.0004  4  3y, 4m  0.010  0.003 
    [0.003]  [0.004]      [0.006]  [0.006] 
-4  2y, 8m  -0.003  -0.0009  5  3y, 5m  0.007  0.004 
    [0.004]  [0.005]      [0.006]  [0.006] 
-3  2y, 9m  -0.002  0.0003  6  3y, 6m  0.004  0.007 
    [0.004]  [0.005]      [0.006]  [0.006] 
-2  2y, 10m  -0.002  0.002  7  3y, 7m  0.004  0.005 
    [0.004]  [0.005]      [0.006]  [0.005] 
-1  2y, 11m  0.002  0.0007  8  3y, 8m  0.005  0.003 
    [0.005]  [0.005]      [0.006]  [0.005] 
0  3y, 0m  0.005  0.004  9  3y, 9m  0.0007  -0.001 
    [0.005]  [0.005]      [0.006]  [0.005] 
1  3y, 1m  0.007  0.001  10  3y, 10m  -0.002  -0.003 
    [0.005]  [0.006]      [0.006]  [0.005] 
2  3y, 2m  0.010  0.002  11  3y, 11m  0.0004  -0.004 
    [0.005]  [0.005]      [0.006]  [0.006] 
 
Estimates from a series of linear probability models which also include controls for: admissions policy area, gender, 
ethnicity, age, number of children, age of youngest child relative to cut-off, day of week of birth of youngest child, 
whether youngest child born on a bank holiday, employment and welfare histories, an indicator for the amount of 
Income  Support  received  (as  a  proxy  for  income),  past  participation  in  a  particular  voluntary  welfare-to-work 
programme (the New Deal for Lone Parents), an indicator of disability, the proportion of formal childcare places 
available  in  the  lone  parents’  local  area,  their  local  area  deprivation  score,  their  local  unemployment  rate,  the 
proportion of lone parents in their local area who are professionals (as a proxy for their own socio-economic status), 
and the proportion of workless lone parents in their area with particular education levels (as a proxy for their own 
education level). We also include a set of local authority dummies and a set of cohort dummies. Full details of all 
coefficient estimates are available from the authors on request. Standard errors are robust, clustered by day of birth 
and shown in parentheses.   51 
 
 
Table B2  Effect of youngest child being born before (rather than after) 1 September cut-off 
determining eligibility for part-time nursery education in Policy 2 areas, using sample of parents 
whose youngest child turns three between 2001 and 2004 and who live in local authorities given 







Effect on % 
off benefit 







Effect on % 
off benefit 
Effect on % 
in work 
-6  2y, 6m  -0.004  -0.005  3  3y, 3m  -0.006  -0.001 
    [0.002]  [0.004]      [0.007]  [0.007] 
-5  2y, 7m  -0.006  0.001  4  3y, 4m  -0.005  0.00007 
    [0.004]  [0.005]      [0.007]  [0.008] 
-4  2y, 8m  -0.008  -0.001  5  3y, 5m  -0.011  0.002 
    [0.004]  [0.006]      [0.007]  [0.008] 
-3  2y, 9m  -0.011*  -0.004  6  3y, 6m  -0.008  0.004 
    [0.005]  [0.006]      [0.007]  [0.007] 
-2  2y, 10m  -0.010  -0.002  7  3y, 7m  -0.007  0.005 
    [0.005]  [0.006]      [0.008]  [0.007] 
-1  2y, 11m  -0.009  -0.003  8  3y, 8m  -0.008  0.002 
    [0.006]  [0.006]      [0.007]  [0.007] 
0  3y, 0m  -0.008  0.001  9  3y, 9m  -0.009  -0.002 
    [0.006]  [0.006]      [0.007]  [0.007] 
1  3y, 1m  -0.007  -0.0007  10  3y, 10m  -0.009  -0.001 
    [0.006]  [0.007]      [0.007]  [0.007] 
2  3y, 2m  -0.009  -0.0002  11  3y, 11m  -0.008  -0.006 
    [0.007]  [0.007]      [0.007]  [0.008] 
 
See notes to Table B1. 
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Table B3  Effect of youngest child being born before (rather than after) 1 September cut-off 
determining eligibility for part-time nursery education in Policy 1 areas, using sample of parents 








Effect on % 
off benefit 
Effect on 






Effect on % 
off benefit 
Effect on % 
in work 
-6  2y, 6m  0.002  0.002  3  3y, 3m  0.017**  0.006 
    [0.003]  [0.004]      [0.006]  [0.005] 
-5  2y, 7m  0.002  0.005  4  3y, 4m  0.020**  0.005 
    [0.004]  [0.005]      [0.006]  [0.005] 
-4  2y, 8m  -0.002  -0.002  5  3y, 5m  0.019**  0.008 
    [0.004]  [0.005]      [0.007]  [0.005] 
-3  2y, 9m  0.003  -0.002  6  3y, 6m  0.017**  0.014** 
    [0.005]  [0.005]      [0.007]  [0.005] 
-2  2y, 10m  0.004  -0.002  7  3y, 7m  0.016*  0.010 
    [0.005]  [0.005]      [0.007]  [0.005] 
-1  2y, 11m  0.007  0.001  8  3y, 8m  0.018**  0.012* 
    [0.005]  [0.005]      [0.006]  [0.006] 
0  3y, 0m  0.015*  0.003  9  3y, 9m  0.014*  0.012* 
    [0.006]  [0.004]      [0.007]  [0.006] 
1  3y, 1m  0.014*  0.002  10  3y, 10m  0.016*  0.013* 
    [0.006]  [0.005]      [0.007]  [0.005] 
2  3y, 2m  0.015*  0.004  11  3y, 11m  0.022**  0.013* 
    [0.006]  [0.005]      [0.007]  [0.006] 
 
See notes to Table B1. 
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Table B4  Effect of youngest child being born before (rather than after) 1 September cut-off 
determining eligibility for part-time nursery education in Policy 2 areas, using sample of parents 








Effect on % 
off  
benefit 







Effect on % 
off  
benefit 
Effect on % 
in work 
-6  2y, 6m  -0.003  0.002  3  3y, 3m  0.010  0.009 
    [0.003]  [0.005]      [0.007]  [0.007] 
-5  2y, 7m  -0.005  0.007  4  3y, 4m  0.011  0.011 
    [0.004]  [0.006]      [0.008]  [0.007] 
-4  2y, 8m  -0.007  0.003  5  3y, 5m  0.011  0.018** 
    [0.005]  [0.006]      [0.009]  [0.007] 
-3  2y, 9m  -0.0006  -0.0009  6  3y, 6m  0.016  0.020** 
    [0.006]  [0.006]      [0.009]  [0.007] 
-2  2y, 10m  -0.0008  0.001  7  3y, 7m  0.012  0.021** 
    [0.005]  [0.006]      [0.009]  [0.007] 
-1  2y, 11m  -0.0003  -0.002  8  3y, 8m  0.010  0.021** 
    [0.006]  [0.006]      [0.009]  [0.007] 
0  3y, 0m  0.005  0.005  9  3y, 9m  0.007  0.016* 
    [0.007]  [0.006]      [0.010]  [0.007] 
1  3y, 1m  0.005  0.006  10  3y, 10m  0.008  0.019** 
    [0.007]  [0.006]      [0.010]  [0.007] 
2  3y, 2m  0.008  0.009  11  3y, 11m  0.012  0.022** 
    [0.007]  [0.007]      [0.010]  [0.007] 
 
See notes to Table B1. 
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Table C1  Effect on welfare receipt of youngest child being born immediately before (rather than 























-6  -0.00007  0.00009  6  0.046**  0.013*  18  0.020  0.003 
  [0.005]  [0.002]    [0.013]  [0.006]    [0.015]  [0.007] 
-5  0.011  0.004  7  0.045**  0.012*  19  0.008  -0.002 
  [0.007]  [0.003]    [0.012]  [0.006]    [0.014]  [0.007] 
-4  0.005  -0.0003  8  0.042**  0.016**  20  0.012  -0.001 
  [0.009]  [0.004]    [0.012]  [0.006]    [0.014]  [0.007] 
-3  0.010  -0.0009  9  0.043**  0.016**  21  0.016  -0.003 
  [0.009]  [0.004]    [0.011]  [0.006]    [0.015]  [0.007] 
-2  0.008  -0.002  10  0.038**  0.015*  22  0.015  -0.005 
  [0.009]  [0.004]    [0.011]  [0.006]    [0.016]  [0.008] 
-1  0.008  -0.004  11  0.032**  0.014*  23  0.010  -0.003 
  [0.010]  [0.004]    [0.011]  [0.006]    [0.016]  [0.007] 
0  0.007  -0.008  12  0.028*  0.013  24  0.012  0.0001 
  [0.010]  [0.004]    [0.012]  [0.007]    [0.016]  [0.008] 
1  0.010  -0.007  13  0.024  0.011  25  0.008  -0.005 
  [0.011]  [0.006]    [0.012]  [0.006]    [0.016]  [0.008] 
2  0.032**  0.001  14  0.020  0.007  26  0.006  -0.006 
  [0.011]  [0.005]    [0.013]  [0.007]    [0.015]  [0.008] 
3  0.033**  0.002  15  0.026  0.008  27  0.011  -0.005 
  [0.012]  [0.005]    [0.014]  [0.006]    [0.014]  [0.008] 
4  0.028*  0.005  16  0.021  0.002  28  0.013  -0.005 
  [0.012]  [0.006]    [0.014]  [0.007]    [0.014]  [0.008] 
5  0.039**  0.006  17  0.024  0.002  29  0.018  -0.002 
  [0.013]  [0.006]    [0.014]  [0.007]    [0.014]  [0.007] 
 
Estimates from a series of linear probability models which also include controls for: gender, ethnicity, age, number of 
children, age of youngest child relative to cut-off, day of week of birth of youngest child, whether youngest child born 
on a bank holiday, employment and welfare histories, an indicator for the amount of Income Support received (as a 
proxy for income), past participation in a particular voluntary welfare-to-work programme (the New Deal for Lone 
Parents), an indicator of disability, the proportion of formal childcare places available in the lone parents’ local area, 
their local area deprivation score, their local unemployment rate, the proportion of lone parents in their local area 
who are professionals (as a proxy for their own socio-economic status), and the proportion of workless lone parents in 
their area with particular education levels (as a proxy for their own education level). We also include a set of local 
authority dummies and a set of cohort dummies. Full details of all coefficient estimates are available from the authors 
on request. Standard errors are robust, clustered by day of birth and shown in parentheses.   55 
 
 
Table C2  Effect on employment of youngest child being born immediately before (rather than 


























-6  0.016*  0.011**  6  0.054**  0.018**  18  0.024  -0.002 
  [0.007]  [0.004]    [0.012]  [0.005]    [0.013]  [0.007] 
-5  0.023*  0.007  7  0.056**  0.018**  19  0.018  0.003 
  [0.009]  [0.004]    [0.013]  [0.006]    [0.012]  [0.007] 
-4  0.020  0.004  8  0.057**  0.020**  20  0.024  0.005 
  [0.010]  [0.005]    [0.013]  [0.006]    [0.012]  [0.007] 
-3  0.026*  0.007  9  0.058**  0.017**  21  0.023  0.006 
  [0.011]  [0.005]    [0.013]  [0.006]    [0.013]  [0.008] 
-2  0.029*  0.004  10  0.052**  0.013*  22  0.019  0.002 
  [0.011]  [0.005]    [0.013]  [0.007]    [0.013]  [0.007] 
-1  0.027*  0.004  11  0.053**  0.015*  23  0.013  -0.0003 
  [0.011]  [0.006]    [0.013]  [0.007]    [0.013]  [0.007] 
0  0.032**  0.006  12  0.053**  0.011  24  0.0076  0.0002 
  [0.012]  [0.005]    [0.013]  [0.007]    [0.013]  [0.007] 
1  0.034**  0.008  13  0.038**  0.0044  25  0.011  0.0006 
  [0.011]  [0.005]    [0.013]  [0.007]    [0.013]  [0.007] 
2  0.044**  0.009  14  0.035*  0.007  26  0.013  -0.00008 
  [0.011]  [0.005]    [0.014]  [0.006]    [0.013]  [0.008] 
3  0.036**  0.008  15  0.039**  0.004  27  0.021  0.0004 
  [0.012]  [0.006]    [0.013]  [0.006]    [0.013]  [0.008] 
4  0.047**  0.013*  16  0.040**  0.002  28  0.018  -0.002 
  [0.012]  [0.005]    [0.013]  [0.006]    [0.014]  [0.008] 
5  0.047**  0.015**  17  0.030*  -0.003  29  0.02  -0.002 
  [0.012]  [0.005]    [0.013]  [0.006]    [0.013]  [0.008] 
 
See notes to Table C1. 
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Table C3  Effect on welfare receipt of youngest child being born immediately before (rather than 































-6  0.004  -0.0007  6  0.039**  0.012*  18  0.015  0.003 
  [0.004]  [0.002]    [0.010]  [0.006]    [0.010]  [0.007] 
-5  0.014*  0.003  7  0.039**  0.010  19  0.010  -0.004 
  [0.006]  [0.004]    [0.010]  [0.006]    [0.010]  [0.007] 
-4  0.008  -0.001  8  0.044**  0.013*  20  0.012  -0.002 
  [0.007]  [0.004]    [0.010]  [0.006]    [0.011]  [0.007] 
-3  0.014*  -0.003  9  0.048**  0.013*  21  0.011  -0.004 
  [0.006]  [0.004]    [0.010]  [0.005]    [0.011]  [0.007] 
-2  0.014*  -0.004  10  0.042**  0.012*  22  0.009  -0.005 
  [0.006]  [0.004]    [0.010]  [0.006]    [0.011]  [0.008] 
-1  0.014*  -0.006  11  0.042**  0.010  23  0.009  -0.004 
  [0.007]  [0.004]    [0.010]  [0.006]    [0.011]  [0.007] 
0  0.009  -0.010*  12  0.043**  0.009  24  0.012  -0.0008 
  [0.007]  [0.005]    [0.009]  [0.006]    [0.011]  [0.008] 
1  0.011  -0.008  13  0.032**  0.008  25  0.004  -0.005 
  [0.008]  [0.006]    [0.009]  [0.006]    [0.012]  [0.008] 
2  0.023*  0.0008  14  0.024*  0.006  26  0.008  -0.008 
  [0.009]  [0.005]    [0.010]  [0.007]    [0.012]  [0.008] 
3  0.026**  0.001  15  0.022*  0.007  27  0.008  -0.006 
  [0.009]  [0.005]    [0.009]  [0.007]    [0.012]  [0.008] 
4  0.024*  0.004  16  0.012  0.002  28  0.009  -0.005 
  [0.010]  [0.006]    [0.010]  [0.007]    [0.012]  [0.007] 
5  0.029**  0.006  17  0.014  0.003  29  0.014  -0.003 
  [0.010]  [0.006]    [0.010]  [0.007]    [0.011]  [0.008] 
 
See notes to Table C1. 
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Table C4  Effect on employment of youngest child being born immediately before (rather than 






























-6  0.019*  0.010**  6  0.046**  0.016**  18  0.016  -0.003 
  [0.008]  [0.003]    [0.010]  [0.005]    [0.011]  [0.007] 
-5  0.018*  0.007  7  0.048**  0.017**  19  0.020  0.001 
  [0.008]  [0.004]    [0.010]  [0.006]    [0.011]  [0.007] 
-4  0.016  0.003  8  0.051**  0.019**  20  0.020  0.004 
  [0.009]  [0.004]    [0.011]  [0.006]    [0.011]  [0.007] 
-3  0.026**  0.005  9  0.049**  0.015*  21  0.021  0.005 
  [0.010]  [0.005]    [0.011]  [0.006]    [0.011]  [0.008] 
-2  0.023*  0.003  10  0.044**  0.012  22  0.019  0.0006 
  [0.010]  [0.005]    [0.011]  [0.007]    [0.011]  [0.007] 
-1  0.024*  0.003  11  0.038**  0.015*  23  0.014  -0.002 
  [0.010]  [0.006]    [0.011]  [0.007]    [0.011]  [0.007] 
0  0.027**  0.006  12  0.040**  0.010  24  0.019  -0.003 
  [0.010]  [0.005]    [0.011]  [0.007]    [0.011]  [0.007] 
1  0.029**  0.007  13  0.031**  0.003  25  0.017  -0.002 
  [0.010]  [0.005]    [0.010]  [0.007]    [0.011]  [0.008] 
2  0.038**  0.008  14  0.027*  0.007  26  0.018  -0.002 
  [0.010]  [0.005]    [0.011]  [0.006]    [0.011]  [0.008] 
3  0.033**  0.006  15  0.022  0.005  27  0.016  -0.0001 
  [0.010]  [0.006]    [0.011]  [0.006]    [0.012]  [0.008] 
4  0.034**  0.013*  16  0.022*  0.002  28  0.011  -0.002 
  [0.010]  [0.005]    [0.010]  [0.006]    [0.012]  [0.008] 
5  0.038**  0.014**  17  0.018  -0.003  29  0.014  -0.002 
  [0.010]  [0.005]    [0.010]  [0.006]    [0.011]  [0.008] 
 
See notes to Table C1. 
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Appendix  D 
Specification Tests 
 
Table D1  Effect of youngest child being born immediately before (rather than immediately 





















Effect on % 
off benefit 
Effect on % 
in work 
-6  0.003  0.011  6  0.027  0.022  18  0.016  -0.015 
  [0.003]  [0.007]    [0.013]  [0.011]    [0.016]  [0.013] 
-5  0.008  0.013  7  0.027  0.012  19  0.010  -0.014 
  [0.007]  [0.007]    [0.015]  [0.014]    [0.015]  [0.013] 
-4  0.011  0.006  8  0.028  0.021  20  0.003  -0.020 
  [0.009]  [0.007]    [0.016]  [0.015]    [0.016]  [0.014] 
-3  0.004  0.014  9  0.032*  0.019  21  0.008  -0.024 
  [0.009]  [0.009]    [0.014]  [0.016]    [0.017]  [0.013] 
-2  0.014  0.011  10  0.033*  0.009  22  0.005  -0.020 
  [0.008]  [0.009]    [0.013]  [0.017]    [0.018]  [0.012] 
-1  0.018*  0.004  11  0.031  0.008  23  0.004  -0.026* 
  [0.007]  [0.010]    [0.015]  [0.016]    [0.018]  [0.012] 
0  0.011  0.005  12  0.028  0.003  24  0.005  -0.026 
  [0.007]  [0.010]    [0.016]  [0.016]    [0.018]  [0.014] 
1  0.012  0.008  13  0.029  0.005  25  0.0005  -0.021 
  [0.010]  [0.012]    [0.015]  [0.014]    [0.019]  [0.013] 
2  0.024  0.015  14  0.026  0.0009  26  -0.008  -0.022 
  [0.012]  [0.012]    [0.014]  [0.013]    [0.018]  [0.013] 
3  0.017  0.012  15  0.023  -0.0003  27  -0.008  -0.027* 
  [0.011]  [0.012]    [0.014]  [0.014]    [0.017]  [0.013] 
4  0.021  0.016  16  0.017  -0.007  28  -0.008  -0.029 
  [0.012]  [0.011]    [0.014]  [0.010]    [0.015]  [0.015] 
5  0.020  0.017  17  0.017  -0.016  29  -0.012  -0.027 
  [0.014]  [0.011]    [0.014]  [0.011]    [0.014]  [0.014] 
 
Estimates from a series of linear probability models which also include controls for: gender, ethnicity, age, number of 
children, age of youngest child relative to cut-off, day of week of birth of youngest child, whether youngest child born 
on a bank holiday, employment and welfare histories, an indicator for the amount of Income Support received (as a 
proxy for income), past participation in a particular voluntary welfare-to-work programme (the New Deal for Lone 
Parents), an indicator of disability, the proportion of formal childcare places available in the lone parents’ local area, 
their local area deprivation score, their local unemployment rate, the proportion of lone parents in their local area 
who are professionals (as a proxy for their own socio-economic status), and the proportion of workless lone parents in 
their area with particular education levels (as a proxy for their own education level). We also include a set of local 
authority dummies and a set of cohort dummies. Full details of all coefficient estimates are available from the authors 




Table D2  Effect of youngest child being born immediately before (rather than immediately 





Effect on % 
off benefit 
Effect on 












Effect on % 
off benefit 
Effect on 
% in work 
-6  0.002  0.012*  6  0.015  0.020**  18  0.009  -0.002 
  [0.002]  [0.005]    [0.008]  [0.007]    [0.010]  [0.010] 
-5  0.006  0.010  7  0.015  0.017  19  0.004  0.003 
  [0.005]  [0.005]    [0.008]  [0.009]    [0.010]  [0.010] 
-4  0.006  0.004  8  0.019*  0.023*  20  -0.0004  0.008 
  [0.006]  [0.006]    [0.008]  [0.009]    [0.010]  [0.011] 
-3  0.004  0.008  9  0.024**  0.023*  21  0.001  0.006 
  [0.006]  [0.007]    [0.007]  [0.010]    [0.011]  [0.011] 
-2  0.005  0.008  10  0.026**  0.018  22  -0.0005  0.004 
  [0.005]  [0.008]    [0.008]  [0.010]    [0.012]  [0.010] 
-1  0.0008  0.004  11  0.024**  0.016  23  0.003  0.002 
  [0.006]  [0.008]    [0.008]  [0.010]    [0.011]  [0.010] 
0  -0.003  0.010  12  0.021*  0.016  24  0.006  0.0002 
  [0.006]  [0.007]    [0.009]  [0.011]    [0.012]  [0.011] 
1  -0.004  0.011  13  0.021*  0.010  25  0.003  0.003 
  [0.007]  [0.008]    [0.009]  [0.010]    [0.012]  [0.011] 
2  0.004  0.014  14  0.016  0.007  26  0.0011  -0.0008 
  [0.008]  [0.007]    [0.009]  [0.010]    [0.011]  [0.011] 
3  0.004  0.012  15  0.013  0.006  27  0.002  -0.003 
  [0.008]  [0.008]    [0.009]  [0.010]    [0.011]  [0.011] 
4  0.006  0.018*  16  0.009  0.004  28  0.002  -0.003 
  [0.008]  [0.007]    [0.009]  [0.008]    [0.010]  [0.012] 
5  0.007  0.021**  17  0.010  -0.0007  29  0.002  -0.008 
  [0.009]  [0.007]    [0.009]  [0.009]    [0.010]  [0.011] 
 
See notes to Table D1. 
   60 
 
 
Table D3   Effect of youngest child being born immediately before (rather than immediately 





Effect on % 
off benefit 

















% in work 
-6  0.0002  0.008**  6  0.019**  0.027**  18  0.008  0.009 
  [0.002]  [0.003]    [0.005]  [0.004]    [0.005]  [0.006] 
-5  0.004  0.010**  7  0.018**  0.027**  19  0.004  0.009 
  [0.003]  [0.003]    [0.005]  [0.005]    [0.005]  [0.006] 
-4  0.0008  0.009*  8  0.021**  0.029**  20  0.005  0.010 
  [0.003]  [0.004]    [0.005]  [0.005]    [0.005]  [0.006] 
-3  0.0009  0.008*  9  0.023**  0.027**  21  0.004  0.011 
  [0.003]  [0.004]    [0.005]  [0.005]    [0.006]  [0.007] 
-2  0.002  0.008  10  0.022**  0.026**  22  0.002  0.006 
  [0.003]  [0.004]    [0.005]  [0.006]    [0.006]  [0.006] 
-1  0.0009  0.009  11  0.020**  0.026**  23  0.005  0.005 
  [0.004]  [0.005]    [0.005]  [0.006]    [0.006]  [0.006] 
0  -0.004  0.009*  12  0.019**  0.024**  24  0.005  0.004 
  [0.004]  [0.004]    [0.005]  [0.006]    [0.006]  [0.006] 
1  0.00009  0.014**  13  0.018**  0.019**  25  0.002  0.004 
  [0.005]  [0.005]    [0.005]  [0.006]    [0.006]  [0.006] 
2  0.007  0.017**  14  0.011*  0.019**  26  0.001  0.003 
  [0.004]  [0.004]    [0.005]  [0.006]    [0.006]  [0.006] 
3  0.010*  0.016**  15  0.014**  0.018**  27  0.001  0.004 
  [0.005]  [0.005]    [0.005]  [0.006]    [0.006]  [0.007] 
4  0.012*  0.022**  16  0.010  0.016**  28  0.002  0.0005 
  [0.005]  [0.004]    [0.005]  [0.006]    [0.006]  [0.007] 
5  0.013**  0.024**  17  0.007  0.010  29  0.003  -0.0003 
  [0.005]  [0.004]    [0.005]  [0.006]    [0.006]  [0.007] 
 
See notes to Table D1. 
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Table D4   Effect of youngest child being born immediately before (rather than immediately 





Effect on % 
off benefit 





Effect on % 
off benefit 
Effect on 







Effect on % 
in work 
-6  -0.0004  0.010  6  0.013  0.021**  18  0.007  -0.001 
  [0.003]  [0.005]    [0.009]  [0.008]    [0.010]  [0.009] 
-5  0.006  0.007  7  0.015  0.017  19  0.003  0.003 
  [0.005]  [0.006]    [0.010]  [0.010]    [0.010]  [0.009] 
-4  0.006  0.002  8  0.017  0.023*  20  0.001  0.008 
  [0.006]  [0.007]    [0.009]  [0.010]    [0.010]  [0.010] 
-3  0.001  0.007  9  0.025**  0.025*  21  0.001  0.005 
  [0.006]  [0.008]    [0.008]  [0.010]    [0.012]  [0.010] 
-2  0.001  0.008  10  0.026**  0.019  22  -0.0006  0.003 
  [0.006]  [0.008]    [0.008]  [0.011]    [0.012]  [0.009] 
-1  -0.0005  0.004  11  0.026**  0.018  23  0.002  0.0007 
  [0.006]  [0.008]    [0.009]  [0.010]    [0.012]  [0.010] 
0  -0.007  0.010  12  0.019  0.016  24  0.005  -0.0007 
  [0.006]  [0.007]    [0.010]  [0.010]    [0.012]  [0.010] 
1  -0.006  0.010  13  0.019  0.009  25  0.005  0.005 
  [0.008]  [0.008]    [0.010]  [0.009]    [0.012]  [0.010] 
2  0.003  0.013  14  0.017  0.007  26  0.0003  0.003 
  [0.009]  [0.008]    [0.009]  [0.009]    [0.012]  [0.010] 
3  0.003  0.009  15  0.014  0.005  27  0.004  0.0002 
  [0.008]  [0.009]    [0.009]  [0.009]    [0.012]  [0.010] 
4  0.003  0.017*  16  0.010  0.002  28  0.003  -0.002 
  [0.009]  [0.008]    [0.009]  [0.008]    [0.011]  [0.011] 
5  0.004  0.021*  17  0.010  -0.002  29  0.004  -0.006 
  [0.009]  [0.008]    [0.009]  [0.008]    [0.010]  [0.011] 
 
See notes to Table D1. 
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Table D5  Effect of youngest child being born before (rather than after) 1 September cut-off in 













Effect on % 
off benefit 








Effect on % 
in work 
-6  -0.0009  0.010*  6  0.018**  0.020**  18  0.0005  0.003 
  [0.003]  [0.005]    [0.007]  [0.007]    [0.008]  [0.009] 
-5  0.005  0.006  7  0.015*  0.025**  19  -0.007  0.005 
  [0.004]  [0.005]    [0.007]  [0.007]    [0.008]  [0.009] 
-4  -0.002  0.005  8  0.019**  0.024**  20  -0.002  0.011 
  [0.005]  [0.005]    [0.006]  [0.007]    [0.008]  [0.009] 
-3  0.0003  0.005  9  0.017*  0.019**  21  -0.005  0.014 
  [0.005]  [0.006]    [0.007]  [0.007]    [0.008]  [0.010] 
-2  -0.005  0.002  10  0.014*  0.017*  22  -0.007  0.007 
  [0.005]  [0.007]    [0.007]  [0.008]    [0.009]  [0.010] 
-1  -0.008  0.006  11  0.012  0.019*  23  -0.004  0.007 
  [0.005]  [0.008]    [0.007]  [0.008]    [0.008]  [0.010] 
0  -0.010  0.008  12  0.011  0.013  24  -0.002  0.008 
  [0.006]  [0.007]    [0.007]  [0.009]    [0.009]  [0.010] 
1  -0.007  0.009  13  0.007  0.006  25  -0.007  0.007 
  [0.007]  [0.007]    [0.007]  [0.008]    [0.009]  [0.010] 
2  0.002  0.010  14  0.003  0.010  26  -0.007  0.007 
  [0.006]  [0.006]    [0.009]  [0.008]    [0.009]  [0.010] 
3  0.006  0.008  15  0.006  0.007  27  -0.003  0.010 
  [0.007]  [0.006]    [0.008]  [0.008]    [0.009]  [0.010] 
4  0.007  0.015*  16  -0.00003  0.008  28  -0.004  0.007 
  [0.007]  [0.007]    [0.009]  [0.008]    [0.009]  [0.010] 
5  0.011  0.016*  17  -0.0005  0.003  29  -0.0005  0.009 
  [0.007]  [0.007]    [0.009]  [0.008]    [0.009]  [0.010] 
 
See notes to Table D1. 
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Appendix  E 
Placebo Tests 
 
Table E1  Effect of youngest child being born immediately before (rather than immediately after) 













Effect on % 
off benefit 
Effect on 







Effect on % 
in work 
-6  -0.002  0.002  6  -0.0008  0.003  18  -0.003  0.010* 
  [0.002]  [0.002]    [0.006]  [0.004]    [0.006]  [0.004] 
-5  -0.003  0.005  7  -0.002  0.005  19  -0.003  0.005 
  [0.003]  [0.003]    [0.006]  [0.005]    [0.006]  [0.004] 
-4  -0.005  0.002  8  -0.006  0.004  20  -0.0002  0.007 
  [0.003]  [0.003]    [0.006]  [0.005]    [0.006]  [0.004] 
-3  -0.009*  0.003  9  -0.002  0.005  21  -0.005  0.005 
  [0.004]  [0.003]    [0.006]  [0.005]    [0.006]  [0.004] 
-2  -0.007  0.002  10  -0.001  0.004  22  -0.002  0.007 
  [0.004]  [0.003]    [0.006]  [0.005]    [0.006]  [0.004] 
-1  -0.009*  -0.001  11  0.00007  0.006  23  0.0007  0.006 
  [0.005]  [0.003]    [0.006]  [0.004]    [0.006]  [0.005] 
0  -0.006  -0.0006  12  0.002  0.008  24  0.0006  0.011* 
  [0.004]  [0.004]    [0.006]  [0.005]    [0.006]  [0.005] 
1  -0.008  0.002  13  0.002  0.006  25  0.0006  0.012* 
  [0.004]  [0.004]    [0.006]  [0.005]    [0.006]  [0.005] 
2  -0.003  0.003  14  0.0001  0.006  26  0.003  0.011* 
  [0.005]  [0.005]    [0.006]  [0.005]    [0.006]  [0.005] 
3  -0.005  0.002  15  0.001  0.005  27  0.003  0.013* 
  [0.005]  [0.004]    [0.006]  [0.005]    [0.006]  [0.005] 
4  -0.004  0.005  16  0.00002  0.005  28  0.0003  0.012* 
  [0.005]  [0.004]    [0.006]  [0.005]    [0.006]  [0.005] 
5  -0.005  0.006  17  -0.002  0.008  29  0.002  0.014** 
  [0.006]  [0.004]    [0.006]  [0.005]    [0.006]  [0.005] 
Estimates from a series of linear probability models, which also include controls for: gender, ethnicity, age, number of 
children, age of youngest child relative to cut-off, day of week of birth of youngest child, whether youngest child born 
on a bank holiday, employment and welfare histories, an indicator for the amount of Income Support received (as a 
proxy for income), past participation in a particular voluntary welfare-to-work programme (the New Deal for Lone 
Parents), an indicator of disability, the proportion of formal childcare places available in the lone parents’ local area, 
their local area deprivation score, their local unemployment rate, the proportion of lone parents in their local area 
who are professionals (as a proxy for their own socio-economic status), and the proportion of workless lone parents in 
their area with particular education levels (as a proxy for their own education level). We also include a set of local 
authority dummies and a set of cohort dummies. Full details of all coefficient estimates are available from the authors 
on request. Standard errors are robust, clustered by day of birth and shown in parentheses.   64 
 
 
Table E2  Effect of youngest child being born immediately before (rather than immediately after) 





Effect on % 
off benefit 
Effect on 




Effect on % 
off benefit 
Effect on 




Effect on % 
off benefit 
Effect on 
% in work 
-6  -0.0008  0.002  6  0.003  0.0003  18  -0.0007  -0.007 
  [0.002]  [0.004]    [0.007]  [0.006]    [0.008]  [0.006] 
-5  -0.002  0.006  7  0.003  0.002  19  0.0009  -0.008 
  [0.003]  [0.005]    [0.007]  [0.006]    [0.008]  [0.007] 
-4  -0.0007  0.005  8  0.001  -0.0007  20  0.004  -0.008 
  [0.004]  [0.005]    [0.007]  [0.007]    [0.009]  [0.007] 
-3  -0.002  0.004  9  -0.002  -0.003  21  0.003  -0.007 
  [0.004]  [0.005]    [0.008]  [0.007]    [0.009]  [0.007] 
-2  0.001  0.002  10  0.0001  -0.006  22  0.003  -0.006 
  [0.005]  [0.005]    [0.008]  [0.007]    [0.009]  [0.007] 
-1  -0.0002  0.0004  11  -0.0003  -0.010  23  0.003  -0.003 
  [0.005]  [0.005]    [0.007]  [0.006]    [0.009]  [0.008] 
0  0.0004  -0.002  12  -0.004  -0.008  24  -0.005  -0.006 
  [0.006]  [0.005]    [0.007]  [0.007]    [0.009]  [0.008] 
1  0.003  0.0004  13  -0.007  -0.009  25  -0.005  -0.002 
  [0.006]  [0.005]    [0.007]  [0.006]    [0.009]  [0.008] 
2  0.005  0.0003  14  -0.008  -0.009  26  -0.005  -0.005 
  [0.007]  [0.006]    [0.008]  [0.007]    [0.009]  [0.008] 
3  0.003  0.004  15  -0.010  -0.007  27  -0.005  -0.003 
  [0.007]  [0.006]    [0.008]  [0.006]    [0.009]  [0.008] 
4  0.004  0.002  16  -0.006  -0.006  28  -0.007  -0.003 
  [0.007]  [0.006]    [0.008]  [0.006]    [0.009]  [0.008] 
5  0.002  0.0007  17  -0.007  -0.008  29  -0.005  -0.0009 
  [0.007]  [0.006]    [0.008]  [0.006]    [0.009]  [0.008] 
 
See notes to Table E1. 
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Table E3  Effect of youngest child being born immediately before (rather than immediately after) 





Effect on % 
off benefit 





Effect on % 
off benefit 








Effect on % 
in work 
-6  0.005  -0.0009  6  -0.002  -0.014  18  -0.011  -0.014 
  [0.003]  [0.005]    [0.010]  [0.008]    [0.010]  [0.010] 
-5  -0.00009  -0.006  7  -0.002  -0.014  19  -0.010  -0.005 
  [0.004]  [0.006]    [0.010]  [0.009]    [0.010]  [0.009] 
-4  -0.0004  -0.008  8  -0.003  -0.017  20  -0.008  -0.007 
  [0.006]  [0.007]    [0.010]  [0.009]    [0.011]  [0.009] 
-3  0.002  -0.009  9  -0.003  -0.015  21  -0.003  -0.004 
  [0.006]  [0.007]    [0.010]  [0.009]    [0.011]  [0.009] 
-2  -0.0005  -0.010  10  -0.004  -0.018*  22  0.002  -0.004 
  [0.007]  [0.007]    [0.011]  [0.009]    [0.011]  [0.009] 
-1  0.004  -0.010  11  -0.009  -0.021*  23  -0.001  -0.006 
  [0.007]  [0.007]    [0.011]  [0.009]    [0.011]  [0.009] 
0  0.004  -0.008  12  -0.008  -0.021*  24  -0.002  -0.009 
  [0.007]  [0.007]    [0.011]  [0.009]    [0.011]  [0.009] 
1  0.006  -0.010  13  -0.007  -0.017  25  -0.001  -0.004 
  [0.007]  [0.008]    [0.011]  [0.009]    [0.011]  [0.009] 
2  0.002  -0.012  14  -0.003  -0.021*  26  -0.002  -0.001 
  [0.008]  [0.008]    [0.010]  [0.009]    [0.011]  [0.009] 
3  -0.001  -0.011  15  -0.005  -0.017  27  0.0004  0.001 
  [0.009]  [0.008]    [0.010]  [0.009]    [0.011]  [0.009] 
4  -0.004  -0.012  16  -0.004  -0.015  28  0.002  -0.003 
  [0.009]  [0.008]    [0.010]  [0.009]    [0.011]  [0.009] 
5  -0.004  -0.014  17  -0.011  -0.016  29  0.004  -0.004 
  [0.009]  [0.008]    [0.010]  [0.009]    [0.011]  [0.009] 
 
See notes to Table E1. 
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Table E4  Effect of youngest child being born immediately before (rather than immediately after) 





















Effect on % 
off benefit 
Effect on 
% in work 
-6  -0.002  -0.0008  6  -0.010  0.003  18  -0.004  -0.005 
  [0.003]  [0.004]    [0.008]  [0.006]    [0.009]  [0.008] 
-5  0.002  -0.0004  7  -0.011  0.002  19  -0.002  -0.005 
  [0.003]  [0.004]    [0.007]  [0.007]    [0.009]  [0.009] 
-4  -0.003  -0.001  8  -0.012  0.003  20  -0.004  -0.007 
  [0.004]  [0.005]    [0.007]  [0.007]    [0.009]  [0.008] 
-3  0.0006  0.003  9  -0.010  0.001  21  0.0006  -0.001 
  [0.005]  [0.005]    [0.007]  [0.007]    [0.009]  [0.008] 
-2  0.0010  0.005  10  -0.010  0.00003  22  0.0014  -0.001 
  [0.005]  [0.005]    [0.008]  [0.007]    [0.009]  [0.008] 
-1  -0.001  0.003  11  -0.006  -0.002  23  -0.0006  -0.002 
  [0.005]  [0.005]    [0.008]  [0.007]    [0.009]  [0.008] 
0  -0.0001  0.003  12  -0.009  -0.006  24  0.003  0.001 
  [0.006]  [0.006]    [0.008]  [0.007]    [0.010]  [0.008] 
1  -0.00002  0.006  13  -0.012  -0.001  25  0.010  0.002 
  [0.005]  [0.005]    [0.008]  [0.008]    [0.009]  [0.008] 
2  -0.004  0.005  14  -0.010  -0.004  26  0.010  0.002 
  [0.006]  [0.006]    [0.008]  [0.008]    [0.009]  [0.008] 
3  -0.009  0.002  15  -0.010  -0.003  27  0.008  0.002 
  [0.006]  [0.006]    [0.009]  [0.008]    [0.009]  [0.008] 
4  -0.010  0.00009  16  -0.009  -0.007  28  0.010  0.003 
  [0.006]  [0.006]    [0.009]  [0.007]    [0.010]  [0.008] 
5  -0.008  0.0009  17  -0.008  -0.006  29  0.014  -0.001 
  [0.007]  [0.006]    [0.008]  [0.008]    [0.010]  [0.008] 
 
See notes to Table E1. 
 